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ABSTRACT
States around the world are ceding authority to international
institutions, devolving powers to lower-level political subdivisions, and
granting forms of autonomy to Indigenous peoples and other minority
groups. At the same time, states are increasingly offering groups and
individuals “participation rights”: opportunities to participate in sovereign
prerogatives without exercising control. These opportunities range from
providing input into environmental decision-making, to collaborating with
law enforcement in community policing programs, to receiving a share of
natural-resource revenues. This Article contends that all of these
developments represent a dividing up of the collection of rights known as
sovereignty, and that participation rights reflect an emerging international
norm that considers these rights essential to the legitimate exercise of
governmental authority. This Article also argues that the international and
domestic forms of sovereignty-sharing stimulate one another in a
dialectical process. This helps explain how power allocations and
participatory avenues have changed so rapidly in recent decades—and
sometimes in ways that states never could have anticipated.
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INTRODUCTION
Sovereignty is in flux. For centuries, national states have been
considered “sovereign” under international law, meaning that within their
own territories they are supreme over all other authorities and free from
outside interference.1 Yet this classical view of sovereignty no longer
matches reality. In recent decades, national states have ceded aspects of
their authority to international legal regimes and institutions, from
investment treaties that limit their leeway to regulate foreign investors to
human rights systems that constrain their treatment of their own
populations.2 National states have also increasingly transferred authority
to subnational actors, whether by devolving regulatory powers to lower
level political subdivisions or granting new forms of autonomy to
Indigenous peoples and other minority groups.3
Many scholars take these developments as evidence that sovereignty
is waning,4 or even that the nation-state itself is becoming obsolete. 5
Others see sovereignty as alive and well and simply in a process of
1. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 8 (1977)
(defining sovereignty as both “supremacy over all other authorities within [the state’s] territory and
population” and the state’s “independence of outside authorities”); ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA
HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS 26 (1995) (“Traditionally, sovereignty has signified the complete autonomy of the state
to act as it chooses, without legal limitation by any superior entity.”).
2. Robert Jennings, Sovereignty and International Law, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 27, 31 (Gerard Kreijen, Marcel Brus, Jorri Duursma, Elizabeth De
Vos & John Dugard eds., 2002) (“[M]ost, if not indeed all, sovereign governments nowadays have
very seriously limited choices in the exercise of their supposedly sovereign competence, because their
theoretically important areas for decisions are much restricted and hemmed in by treaties, [and] by
customary international law . . . . ”); YULIA LEVASHOVA, THE RIGHT OF STATES TO REGULATE IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE BETWEEN PUBLIC INTEREST AND
FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT 45 (2019) (“[T]he right to regulate is limited by a state’s
obligations under international law, such as the obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment under
an IIA [International Investment Agreement].”).
3. See, e.g., WORLD BANK GRP., EVALUATION OF THE WORLD BANK GROUP ENGAGEMENT ON
STRENGTHENING SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 1 (2018) (“Decentralization has been at the center of
the public policy reform agenda all over the world . . . translat[ing] into an assignment of public
functions from national to subnational governments . . . .”); Shawkat Alam & Abdullah Al Faruque,
From Sovereignty to Self-Determination: Emergence of Collective Rights of Indigenous Peoples in
Natural Resources Management, 32 GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 59, 74 (2019) (“[T]he prevailing trend is
towards granting autonomy to indigenous peoples in matters relating to their own internal and local
affairs . . . .”).
4. Thomas C. Heller & Abraham D. Sofaer, Sovereignty: The Practitioners’ Perspective, in
PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY 24, 39 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001) (“[A] widespread perception
exists that sovereignty, when understood as autonomous and effective control over national territories,
is on the wane.”).
5. Nathan Witkin, A State of the People: The Shift of Sovereignty from Territory to Citizens, 27
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 43 (2017) (“[S]ome argue that state sovereignty can no
longer be delineated with rigid territorial boundaries—going so far as predicting the end of sovereignty
and the death of the modern nation-state.” (footnotes omitted)).

1012

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 44:1009

transformation. In particular, some scholars contend that sovereignty has
gone from a monolith of authority in the hands of the national state to
something that can be divided both horizontally and vertically and
exercised even by non-state actors.6
The present Article embraces this latter view but builds on existing
scholarly accounts by offering new insights into several aspects of
sovereignty’s ongoing transformation. It makes two principal claims.
First, not only is sovereignty divisible on both the international and
domestic planes but it is also increasingly divided into what I will refer to
as “governance rights” and “participation rights.” I define governance
rights as those that entitle the right holder to exercise control over aspects
of governance, such as imposing taxes, adopting or interpreting laws,
punishing crimes, authorizing development activities, and controlling
natural resources.7 Participation rights, by contrast, are opportunities for
groups and individuals to participate in governance functions like these
without exercising control. Examples include the right to vote in elections;
the right to provide input into environmental decision-making; the right to
enforce laws on behalf of the public; the right to collaborate with law
enforcement in a community-policing program; and the right to receive a
share of benefits from state-owned resources.8
Participation rights’ status as elements of sovereignty flows logically
from the notion of “popular sovereignty,” which holds that the state
derives its sovereignty from the people.9 I posit that the people of a state
are not mere passive repositories of sovereignty but active participants in
6. See, e.g., Samantha Besson, Sovereignty, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 82 (2011) (“The division of sovereignty can be vertical or horizontal,
depending on whether it takes place among distinct political entities such as two States or between a
State and the EU, or whether it takes place within a single political entity according to territorial or
other federal divisions or according to distinct political functions.”); John W. Head, Addressing Global
Challenges Through Pluralistic Sovereignty: A Critique of State Sovereignty as a Centerpiece of
International Law, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 727, 784 (2019) (arguing that sovereignty has become more
pluralistic both in the sharing of authority over specific territories and “in the realization that multiple
types of authorities (not just so-called ‘nation-states’ . . . ) can naturally and legitimately exercise
sovereignty”).
7. Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 829 (1999) (“By virtue of its
sovereign powers, a state may enact laws, levy taxes, regulate commerce, imprison criminals, and
conduct all other functions commonly associated with government.”); Petra Gümplová, Sovereignty
Over Natural Resources – A Normative Reinterpretation, 9 GLOB. CONSTITUTIONALISM 7, 17 (2020)
(asserting that under international law states have a right to control “all natural wealth, resources, and
economic activities on, above, and below the[ir] territories” as “a key prerogative attached to state
sovereignty”).
8. Examples of all such rights are provided infra Part II.
9. The concept of popular sovereignty can be traced to John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
They argued that sovereignty originates in the people, who confer authority on the state through a
social contract. Hallie Ludsin, Returning Sovereignty to the People, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 97,
115–18 (2013) (summarizing the views of these theorists).
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it. Indeed, the international community is increasingly recognizing that
peoples, groups, and individuals should have opportunities to participate
meaningfully in governance and in state-controlled benefits: a concept I
will call the “Participation Principle.”10 This Article will demonstrate that
this principle is already widely reflected in domestic laws and regulations,
as well as in international instruments, standards, and human rights court
decisions—all of which either create participation rights or call for their
creation.11 This authority evinces a growing consensus that participation
rights are not merely desirable but to some extent obligatory, as the
operational element of popular sovereignty.
Second, not only is sovereignty increasingly divided into governance
and participation rights but the horizontal and vertical forms of
sovereignty-sharing stimulate one another in a dialectical relationship. For
example, states may commit through an instrument—such as the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights12 (African Charter) or the
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 13—to grant certain collective
rights to subnational peoples.14 This is a form of horizontal sovereignty-

10. As discussed in greater detail infra Section II.C, the asserted principle is a unifying theme
that underlies a variety of participation requirements that are sometimes asserted to be actual or
emerging norms of international law in isolation. See, e.g., Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across
Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence Over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 40
(1989) (“A substantial argument can be made in favor of the existence of a customary law obligation
to accord citizens the right to participate in political governance, although the specific contours of the
obligation are debatable.”); Carl Bruch, Charting New Waters: Public Involvement in the Management
of International Watercourses, 31 ENV’T. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11389 (2001) (arguing that
“public participation in environmental matters may be said to be a norm of customary international
law”); Tara Ward, The Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent: Indigenous Peoples’ Participation
Rights Within International Law, 10 NW U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 54, 84 (2011) (arguing that a customary
international norm is developing that requires states to consult in good faith with Indigenous peoples
prior to exploiting resources within their territories); Elisa Morgera, The Need for an International
Legal Concept of Fair and Equitable Benefit Sharing, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 353, 353–54, 363 (2016)
(identifying international authority providing for states to ensure that stakeholders “participate in” or
“share in” benefits derived from various activities, such as the exploitation of genetic resources or
traditional knowledge, natural resource use, and the fight against climate change); id. at 383
(discussing the possibility that this authority reflects an emerging international customary norm or
general principle of law).
11. See infra Part II.
12. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (entered
into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter African Charter].
13. Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal People in Independent Countries,
June 27, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991) [hereinafter Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples Convention].
14. See Ctr. for Minority Rts. Dev. (Kenya) & Minority Rts. Grp. Int’l on behalf of Endorois
Welfare Council v. Kenya, No. 276/2003, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr.
Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶¶ 155–62 (Feb. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Endorois Case] (finding that the Endorois
people of Kenya constitute a “people” within the meaning of the African Charter); id. ¶ 267 (noting a
prior ruling that “a people inhabiting a specific region within a state can claim the protection of” the
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sharing because states are agreeing with one another what they may and
may not do within their own territories.15 Yet it results in vertical
sovereignty-sharing to the extent that the rights in question contemplate
self-government or participation opportunities for subnational actors.16 In
some cases, the instrument expressly calls for such shared authority or
participation, but in other cases it comes to be interpreted as doing so only
later: a result that may take states by surprise.17
Stimulus for new forms of sovereignty-sharing can also flow in the
other direction. For example, if states allow individuals or groups to
participate in their domestic governance processes in a given way, then
states’ positive experience with these interactions may prompt them to
adopt new participatory frameworks at the international level.18 In
addition, the granting of a particular right to subnational actors may
become sufficiently pervasive that the practice achieves the status of a
general principle of law or a customary international norm. In that event,
even states that have not agreed to adopt the practice are arguably bound
to employ it.19
Sovereignty-sharing thus gives rise to a feedback loop that results in
perpetual pressure on states to share authority, influence, and benefits
more extensively. This pressure helps explain how power allocations and

Charter); Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, supra note 13, art. 1 (defining the “peoples”
covered by the Convention).
15. See Wolf Mannens, Shared Sovereignty? Minority Claims and the Effectiveness of State
Authority, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 145, 146–47 (Gerard
Kreijen, Marcel Brus, Jorri Duursma, Elizabeth De Vos & John Dugard eds., 2002) (explaining that
human rights regimes have resulted in shared sovereignty in the sense that the international community
collectively regulates to some extent relations between minority groups and states); Ludsin, supra note
9, at 105 (“States increasingly have been ceding aspects of their sovereignty to international
organizations, such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, and to regional bodies,
such as the African Union and the European Union . . . . These organizations essentially serve as a
superior authority over states in agreed-upon matters.”).
16. See Endorois Case, supra note 14, ¶¶ 268–81 (holding that the African Charter gives the
Endorois people a right to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources and a right to
development, which includes a right to be consulted about any development projects on its land and
to receive a share of benefits from the state); see also infra Section II.A.2.b (cataloging governance
and participation rights in the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention).
17. See infra Section III.A (discussing human rights instruments that international bodies have
interpreted more expansively over time).
18. See infra Section III.B (discussing this phenomenon with regard to rights to participate in
environmental impact assessment processes).
19. For example, some have argued that states’ practice of consulting with Indigenous peoples
in connection with development activities has reached such a status. See Michelle Biddulph & Dwight
Newman, A Contextualized Account of General Principles of International Law, 26 PACE INT’L L.
REV. 286, 337–41 (2014) (discussing the concepts of general principles and customary norms and
observing that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has held that an obligation to consult
Indigenous peoples is now a general principle of law).
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participatory avenues have changed so rapidly in recent decades—and
sometimes in ways that states never could have anticipated.
Part I of this Article will provide a historical overview of the concept
of sovereignty, developments that have challenged classical notions, and
competing scholarly accounts of the implications. Part II will build on this
literature by developing the contentions that (1) contemporary sovereignty
is divided into governance and participation rights; (2) the latter are
required to some extent by an emerging international norm; and (3) these
twin halves of sovereignty must come together for the legitimate exercise
of governmental authority. Part III will then show that horizontal and
vertical sovereignty-sharing influence one another in a dialectical process,
which has already resulted in rapid change and promises further
transformation going forward.
I. HISTORICAL CONCEPTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND THE DEBATE OVER
ITS CURRENT STATUS
A. Westphalian Sovereignty
In the first modern account of sovereignty written in 1561, Jean
Bodin described sovereignty as absolute and perpetual power inherent in
the state, free from any internal or external restriction.20 He used the term
“souveraineté” to refer to the concept when writing in French, and the
terms “summum imperium” (supreme command) or “summa potestas”
(supreme power) when translating his works into Latin.21 Other early
modern scholars used the same Latin terms when writing about
sovereignty, including Hugo Grotius in the 1620s22 and Thomas Hobbes
in the 1660s.23
By employing the adjective summa or summum, these authors sought
to convey that the sovereign was not simply one authority among many

20. Besson, supra note 6, ¶ 16 (“Bodin’s sovereign authority cannot by definition be subject to
any rule or restriction; sovereignty amounts to the absolute and perpetual power of the Republic.”);
Kent McNeil, Sovereignty and Indigenous Peoples in North America, 22 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 81, 88–89 (2016) (Bodin’s notion of sovereignty “envisaged a world of equal, independent
political units, each with absolute authority within its territorial limits and not subject to any external
temporal power”).
21. EDWARD KEENE, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL THOUGHT: AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
103 (2005); James B. Collins, ‘County Republicans’ and the Concept of Active Citizenship in
Sixteenth-Century Poland and France, in CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY IN A MULTINATIONAL
COMMONWEALTH 228 (Karin Friedrich & Barbara Pendzich eds., 2008).
22. Benjamin Straumann, Early Modern Sovereignty and Its Limits, 16 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
L. 423, 424 (2015).
23. Michael Silverthorne, Political Terms in the Latin of Thomas Hobbes, 2 INT’L J. CLASSICAL
TRADITION 499, 506 (1996); Sandra Field, Hobbes and the Question of Power, 52 J. HIST. PHIL. 61,
68 (2014).
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within its territory but the ultimate authority.24 By doing so, they
distinguished their conception of sovereignty from that which had
prevailed in earlier times.25 During the medieval period, each noble had
been considered “sovereign” within his or her domain, and monarchs had
not always been able to count on obedience from those below them in the
feudal system.26 In addition, the supranational church had claimed
supremacy over secular monarchs throughout the period.27 Bodin and his
successors viewed such pluralistic and overlapping authority as a threat to
order and stability and devised their theory of sovereignty in repudiation
of it.28
These theorists’ conception of sovereignty came to be known as
“Westphalian” sovereignty, after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia that ended
the Wars of Religion in Europe and ushered in the modern system of
international relations.29 Westphalian sovereignty functioned to promote
peaceful relations by discouraging states from intervening in the internal
affairs of other states.30 Yet Westphalian sovereignty was also sometimes
invoked as justification for absolute monarchies, or for coercive efforts by
national states to centralize power in themselves at the expense of

24. Field, supra note 23.
25. JORGE E. NÚÑEZ, SOVEREIGNTY CONFLICTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: A
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE ISSUE 28 (2017) (describing Bodin’s theory of sovereignty as a response to the
perceived disorder of earlier times, when “Western Europe had a struggle between church and state,
[and] principalities and other societal organizations were fighting for power”).
26. FRANCESCO MAIOLO, MEDIEVAL SOVEREIGNTY: MARSILIUS OF PADUA AND BARTOLUS OF
SAXOFERRATO 28–29 (2007) (explaining that medieval sovereignty contemplated a “rich variety of
relationships of super- and subordination existing within the hierarchical order of society . . . a
plurality of powers); id. at 81–82 (quoting a 1283 French law commentary by Philippe de Rémi de
Beaumanoir, asserting that “each baron is sovereign within his barony like the king is sovereign in his
kingdom”); Andrew Bodiford, Cities in International Law: Reclaiming Rights as Global Custom, 23
CUNY L. REV. 1, 10 (2020) (“The typical medieval European state structure featured a king or queen,
a supranational church, lesser nobility like dukes and counts with a degree of sovereignty over their
demesnes . . . .”).
27. Bodiford, supra note 26 , at 11 (“[A] state’s control over all lands within its borders was not
exclusive and the state’s monopoly over legitimate authority within its borders was not internationally
recognized. This is most obvious when considering the enormous power and property of the medieval
European church.”).
28. W.J. STANKIEWICZ, IN DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGNTY 10 (1969) (noting that Bodin and other
classical theorists felt that “order demands a power structure with a head (or supreme decision-maker)
able to make ultimate decisions”); McNeil, supra note 20, at 88 (Bodin’s version of sovereignty sought
to ensure order and stability).
29. Mustafa Aijazuddin, Protection of Religious and Ethnic Minorities Before the Genocide
Convention, 16 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 145, 157 (2020) (describing the Peace of Westphalia’s role
in ending the Wars of Religion and giving rise to “the modern system and concept of State
sovereignty”).
30. Anna Spain, Deciding to Intervene, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 847, 895–97 (2014) (discussing the
role of Westphalian sovereignty and its norm of non-intervention in promoting peaceful relations).
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provincial and local authorities.31 Moreover, colonial powers sought to
rely on the Westphalian version of sovereignty to excuse their subjugation
of peoples outside of Europe.32 These powers reasoned that if leaders they
encountered could not impose their will on their communities in the way
that the monarchs of Europe could, then these leaders were not truly
sovereign and need not be accorded the rights of sovereignty.33
The Westphalian conception of sovereignty became so firmly
entrenched that sovereignty was sometimes still being described in
absolutist terms well into the twentieth century. For example, former U.S.
Secretary of State Robert Lansing defined sovereignty in 1921 as “the
power to do all things without accountability”34 and to “compel the
obedience . . . of every individual composing the political state and within
the territorial state.”35
B. Challenges to Westphalian Assumptions
The association of sovereignty with a dominant and unfettered
national state has become increasingly untenable over the last seventy-five
years. National states have ceded much of their power to subnational and
supranational actors, and power has become more diffuse within national
states themselves, undermining core assumptions of Westphalian
sovereignty.
1. Developments at the International Level
Many of the challenges to Westphalian sovereignty can be traced to
the aftermath of World War II. The international community reacted to the
31. W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law,
84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 866–67 (1990) (Bodin’s and Hobbes’s conception of sovereignty “became a
convenient supplementary secular slogan for the various absolute monarchies of the time”); Bodiford,
supra note 26, at 2 (explaining that Westphalian states absorbed smaller entities into “the unified
nation state with its concentration of power into the metropolitan center, all at the expense of the
sovereignty that small regional powers traditionally held”).
32. McNeil, supra note 20, at 82 (“European nation-states proceeded to colonize North America
by making grandiose territorial claims . . . as though the continent was juridically vacant and the
Indigenous peoples living there did not have sovereignty.”).
33. Id. at 92–93 (noting the absence of a supreme authority among the indigenous peoples of
North America “lay behind the nineteenth and twentieth century view that these peoples were not
sovereign states in the post-Westphalian, European sense”); Michael J. Kelly, Political Downsizing:
The Re-Emergence of Self-Determination, and the Movement Toward Smaller, Ethnically
Homogenous States, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 209, 240 (1999) (explaining that European powers sought
impose their absolutist understanding of sovereignty “on cultures that had historically operated on
systems, albeit undemocratic, of delineated degrees of sovereignty”).
34. ROBERT LANSING, NOTES ON SOVEREIGNTY: FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE STATE AND OF
THE WORLD 3 (1921). For a detailed discussion of Lansing’s views on sovereignty, see Head, supra
note 6, at 776–79.
35. LANSING, supra note 34, at 7.
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horrors of that conflict by adopting a series of instruments that recognized
a panoply of human rights, including the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights36 and the two International Covenants.37 These instruments
significantly restricted states’ freedom of action within their territories—a
phenomenon in tension with Westphalian sovereignty.38
In fact, certain instruments recognized sovereignty as residing not
exclusively in states but also in peoples. The United Nations Charter39 and
both International Covenants40 provide that peoples enjoy a right to selfdetermination, a core right of sovereignty.41 This reflects an embrace of
popular sovereignty: the idea that a state’s authority derives from the
people within its territory and depends on the consent of the governed.42
Moreover, some human rights instruments have been interpreted as
acknowledging that even subnational peoples hold a right to selfdetermination, albeit a version short of a right to independence.43 This
interpretation raises the prospect of subnational actors having claims to

36. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter
UDHR].
37. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 1, Jan. 3,
1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; see also OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FACT SHEET NO. 2 (Rev. 1) (June 1996) (summarizing the
rights announced in the UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR).
38. See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty,” 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31,
33 (1996) (explaining that since World War II “an international law of human rights has penetrated
the once impermeable state entity and now addresses the condition of human rights within every
state”); Alfred van Staden & Hans Vollaard, The Erosion of State Sovereignty: Towards a PostTerritorial World?, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 165, 171–72
(Gerard Kreijen, Marcel Brus, Jorri Duursma, Elizebth De Vos & John Dugard eds., 2002) (“[T]he
classical notion of sovereignty is further challenged by the belief that the legitimacy of the exercise of
political authority by national governments is dependent on respect for human rights.”).
39. U.N., Charter of the United Nations, arts. 1(2) & 55, Oct. 24, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. 16 [hereinafter
UN Charter] (asserting that a core purpose of the United Nations is to ensure “respect for the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”).
40. ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 1(1) (“All peoples have the right of self-determination.”);
ICESCR, supra note 37, art. 1(1) (same).
41. Besson, supra note 6, ¶ 118 (listing self-determination among the rights traditionally
associated with sovereignty).
42. Reisman, supra note 31, at 867 (discussing the emergence and widespread embrace of the
concept of popular sovereignty); Besson, supra note 6, ¶ 83 (explaining that there has been a “shift in
the subject of sovereignty post-1945: peoples have become the subjects of modern international
sovereignty”).
43. James Crawford, The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and
Future, in PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 7, 31–38 (Philip Alston ed., 2001) (noting that the right of selfdetermination is often interpreted as contemplating a right of subnational peoples to determine their
own “internal political status,” but not to secede).
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sovereignty that compete with those of the state—a notion anathema to
Westphalian sovereignty.44
During the post-World War II era, states also formed multiple
international bodies capable of creating or interpreting law in ways that
are binding upon states in their domestic affairs.45 States created some of
these bodies to interpret and apply the above-referenced human rights
instruments,46 while other bodies focused on issues such as trade,47
investment,48 and regional integration.49 The European Union is the most
extreme example. It sets rules on such core aspects of member states’
internal governance as how products are to be marketed within the state’s
territory,50 who is entitled to live and work within the state,51 and rights of
employees.52 States have also created international organizations like the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These banks
sometimes use their financial leverage to pressure states into adopting
domestic policy measures that these states would not otherwise be inclined

44. Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Postcolonial Age,
32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 255, 260 (1996) (discussing the “internal conflict between state rights to selfdetermination, and the rights of minorities within states to dismember or challenge the state in the
name of another competing norm of self-determination”).
45. See, e.g., Julian Ku & John Yoo, Globalization and Sovereignty, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
210, 218 (2013) (“Nation-states establish [international organizations] to resolve interstate disputes,
administer technical standards, create fora to discuss policies, or settle various other issues.”); Noam
Zamir & Paul Barker, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and States’ Right to Regulate under
International Investment Law, 45 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 205, 210 (2017) (explaining that
investment tribunals “scrutinise the sovereign conduct of the executive, legislative, or judicial
branches of host States to assess compliance with the standards of protection” in a treaty).
46. Ricardo Pereira & Orla Gough, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in the 21st
Century: Natural Resource Governance and the Right to Self-Determination of Indigenous Peoples
under International Law, 14 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 451, 473–79 (2014) (discussing the roles and
jurisprudence of the Inter-American and African human rights bodies).
47. See generally Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive,
Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247 (2004) (examining the lawmaking
role of World Trade Organization panels and Appellate Body).
48. See generally Zamir & Barker, supra note 45, at 210 (discussing the adjudicatory authority
of investor-state dispute settlement tribunals).
49. See generally Heller & Sofaer, supra note 4, at 35–36 (“The most significant delegations of
power by states to international bodies are those conferred on the European Community (EC) and
other European institutions,” which make law “supreme within its areas of authority.”).
50. See, e.g., Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein
(Cassis de Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 649 (striking down German legal restrictions on the marketing of
liqueurs in German territory).
51. Angela M. Banks, Bringing Culture Back: Immigrants’ Citizenship Rights in the TwentyFirst Century, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 315, 345–46 (2017) (summarizing EU rules that grant
individuals rights to live and work in EU member states under some circumstances).
52. Carole A. Scott, Money Talks: The Influence of Economic Power on the Employment Laws
and Policies in the United States and France, 7 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 341, 349–50 (2006) (listing EU
employment law directives that establish protections for employees).
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to adopt.53 The roles of all of these bodies are inherently in tension with
the Westphalian notion that states are free to govern their own territories
without outside interference.54
2. Developments at the Domestic Level
Other challenges to Westphalian assumptions result from events in
states’ domestic arenas, which have made governmental authority less
centralized.
In recent decades, national states have devolved massive amounts of
authority and revenues to provincial or local governments, transforming
domestic governance structures around the world.55 Many states have also
granted forms of autonomy to Indigenous peoples or regions populated
primarily by minority groups, either as part of a broader decentralization
framework or in standalone autonomy arrangements.56 Lower-level
authorities also sometimes perform functions that the national state still
claims as its own prerogative, such as when states or cities in the United
States adopt policies in tension with federal immigration rules or when
they worked to implement the Paris Climate Agreement after the Trump
Administration repudiated that agreement.57
53. Mark J. Wolff, Failure of the International Monetary Fund & World Bank to Achieve
Integral Development: A Critical Historical Assessment of Bretton Woods Institutions Policies,
Structures and Governance, 41 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 71 (2013) (discussing states’ creation
of these institutions and conditions that these bodies impose on borrower states, including mandates
to privatize state-owned industries, reduce spending, and adjust interest rates).
54. van Staden & Vollaard, supra note 38, at 172 (“[C]onstraints on the sovereignty of States are
not only imposed by external forces but also by the States themselves when they fatefully and
voluntarily shrank their own power by creating supranational institutions entrusted with the authority
to make binding decisions.”).
55. See, e.g., Andrés Rodríguez-Pose & Nicholas Gill, The Global Trend Towards Devolution
and Its Implications, 21 ENV’T & PLAN. 333, 338 (2003) (“The process of devolution operates through
transfers of authority and resources. Subnational governments across the globe currently enjoy greater
authority and powers than they did a few decades ago. The trend is widespread.”); Jonathan Rodden,
Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement, 36 COMPAR. POL.
481, 481 (2004) (“The basic structure of governance is being transformed in countries around the
world as authority and resources migrate from central to subnational governments.”); EZRA KARMEL,
DECENTRALISING GOVERNMENT: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 1 (June 2017) (“Governments around
the world have transferred significant fiscal, political and administrative responsibilities to subnational levels of government and semi-autonomous organisations.”).
56. See Yash Ghai, Autonomy as a Strategy for Diffusing Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
RESOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR 483, 484–85 (Paul C. Stern & Daniel Druckman eds., 2000)
(summarizing different types of autonomy arrangements); Mohammad Agus Yusoff, Athamabawa
Sarjoon & Mat Ali Hassan, Decentralization as a Tool for Ethnic Diversity Accommodation: A
Conceptual Analysis, 9 J. POL. & L. 55, 59 (2016) (explaining that decentralization reforms have been
used “for accommodating diverse ethnic groups in a larger political system where differences prevail
in terms of socio-cultural, economic conditions and political differences and claiming for more
autonomy”).
57. See Bodiford, supra note 26, at 26–27 (discussing California’s negotiation of an agreement
with China to cooperate on climate change after President Trump withdrew from the Paris Climate
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Meanwhile, power has become less concentrated even within central
governments themselves: a phenomenon that Anne-Marie Slaughter refers
to as “disaggregation.”58 She explains that courts, regulatory agencies, and
other component parts within national states now engage directly with
their counterparts in other countries, sometimes independently of the
foreign ministry or other organs that once held a monopoly on foreign
relations.59
To be sure, even before World War II some national states divided
their functions among distinct branches or agencies, and countries like the
United States and Switzerland have long had federal systems in which the
national state lacks supreme authority over certain subject matters.60 Yet
the profusion of decentralization and autonomy regimes and the increasing
disaggregation of the national state have made authority more diffuse than
ever. Contemporary domestic power structures are thus a far cry from the
concentration of authority in central organs of government that Bodin and
other early theorists saw as the hallmark of sovereignty.61
C. The Implications of Recent Events for Sovereignty
The foregoing developments make clear that key Westphalian
assumptions are no longer tenable. Yet how exactly sovereignty has
changed—and whether the concept even has any continuing relevance—
are matters of vigorous ongoing debate.
As noted in the Introduction, some scholars interpret these events as
signaling the growing obsolescence of sovereignty or even of the nation-

Agreement, and describing it as an example of a measure that “conflicts with the sovereign state’s
national policies and deals with a category of decision-making over which the national government
traditionally claims a monopoly”); id. at 34–35 (discussing the sanctuary city movement in the United
States).
58. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability
of Global Government Networks, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 159, 186 (2004).
59. Id. (noting that sovereign functions of national states are now carried out in the international
system by the likes of “regulatory agencies, ministries, courts, [and] legislatures” that engage and form
networks with their correspondent parts in other countries).
60. Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV.
1, 62 (2014) (explaining that the U.S. system of government, “with its separation of power, checks
and balances, and federalist structure,” was designed to avoid “too much consolidation of authority”);
Paolo Dardanelli & Sean Mueller, Dynamic De/Centralization in Switzerland, 1848–2010, 49
PUBLIUS 1, 138, 144–46 (2017) (discussing the creation of the federal system in Switzerland and
historical limits on the powers of the central government).
61. LEON SHELEFF, THE FUTURE OF TRADITION: CUSTOMARY LAW, COMMON LAW AND LEGAL
PLURALISM 57 (1999) (observing that classical Westphalian sovereignty envisioned “the source of
authority stemming from the state as such, focused on its central organs of government”); McNeil,
supra note 20, at 88 (“According to Bodin, a political community needs a supreme authority—a
sovereign—that can impose its will on all members of the community . . . .”).
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state itself.62 Others do not question the viability of the nation-state but
assert that sovereignty has become “illusory” or “empty” as a legal
principle,63 or is now violated so routinely that it has become largely
fictitious: what Stephen Krasner terms “organized hypocrisy.” 64 Krasner
asserts, for example, that it is a violation of state sovereignty if the IMF
requires a state to modify its internal power structures or spending policies
as a condition of receiving a loan.65 Similarly, critics of investment treaties
often describe the restrictions imposed by those treaties as affronts to state
sovereignty.66
Others take a different view, contending that when a state agrees to
treaties or other arrangements that limit its discretion or confer authority
on other actors, the state is not abrogating its sovereignty but exercising
it.67 Some go a step further, asserting that not only are such arrangements
consistent with state sovereignty, but they represent a dividing up or

62. In addition to the authorities cited in the Introduction, see Jennings, supra note 2, at 34 (“It
has become fashionable to believe that the emergence of new and powerful actors on the international
scene . . . must have resulted in a corresponding diminution of the significance and power of the
sovereign State.”).
63. See, e.g., PHILIP ALLOTT, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: SOCIETY AND LAW BEYOND THE STATE
178 (2002) (“[T]he evolution of the reality of social organisation across the human world has made
the idea of ‘sovereignty’ into an anachronism and an illusion . . . .”); Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity
as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 40, 51, 63–64
(2003) (asserting that sovereignty has become a “comparatively empty and unhelpful idea”).
64. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 7–9 (1999) (“Violations of
Westphalian sovereignty have occurred through both voluntary agreements and the use of
coercion. . . . The multiple pressures on rulers have led to a decoupling between the norm of autonomy
and actual practice. . . . Organized hypocrisy is the normal state of affairs.”).
65. Id. at 144–48 (summarizing the lending practices of the IMF and other international financial
institutions, and concluding that they violate borrower states’ sovereignty because to receive an
infusion of capital these states must compromise their domestic autonomy).
66. Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What’s in a Meme? The Truth About Investor-State
Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
689, 720 (2014) (“The argument has been formulated . . . that arbitration awards [under investment
treaties] are affronts to sovereignty, that they threaten the right of self-determination . . . .”); Jennifer
Bird-Pollan, The Sovereign Right to Tax: How Bilateral Investment Treaties Threaten Sovereignty, 32
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 107, 109 (2018) (asserting that investment treaties threaten
not only the sovereignty of countries whose taxing authority is curtailed by the treaty, but ultimately
“all sovereign authority to tax”).
67. See James Crawford, Sovereignty as a Legal Value, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 117, 124 (James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2012) (“[S]overeignty
plays a central role in treaty-making. States are free to decide whether or not to become parties to
treaties . . . .”); Brower & Blanchard, supra note 66, at 749 (“[Investment] arbitrators decide only
whether an investor is entitled to compensation because a state breached an obligation it undertook—
in an exercise of its sovereign capacity—by concluding a treaty.”); S.S. Wimbledon (U.K. v. Japan),
Judgment, 1923 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 1, at 15, 25 (Aug. 17) (“The Court declines to see in the
conclusion of any Treaty by which a State undertakes to perform or refrain from performing a
particular act an abandonment of its sovereignty.”).
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sharing of that sovereignty.68 The literature uses a variety of terms to
express this notion: not only “sharing” but also “pooling,”
“disaggregation,” or “delegation” of sovereignty.69 However, I will use the
term “sovereignty-sharing” as an umbrella term to cover any scenario in
which prerogatives of sovereignty are allocated among more than one
actor.
Scholars have identified sovereignty-sharing, in one form or another,
at all possible levels: the law-making functions of supranational bodies,70
the separation of functions within national states,71 transfers of power to
provincial and local authorities,72 and forms of self-government exercised
by Indigenous and other subnational peoples.73 In fact, Leon Sheleff
argued that it is a form of sovereignty-sharing if a national state simply
leaves local groups alone, such as when it permits Indigenous or traditional
peoples to maintain their own customs without absorbing them into larger
state frameworks.74
Sheleff’s observation highlights an irony in the notion that the
increasing accommodation of subnational actors signals a transformation
of sovereignty. While from one perspective the growing rights of
Indigenous peoples and other actors can be considered a departure from
classical notions of sovereignty, from another perspective these rights
reflect forms of sovereignty that have existed all along. In that sense, what
may appear to be “new” dimensions of sovereignty are new only in the

68. Heller & Sofaer, supra note 4, at 39 (“[S]cholars widely contend that sovereignty has been
and will continue to be changed and shared . . . .”); Kathleen Claussen & Timothy Nichol,
Reconstructing Sovereignty: The Impact of Norms, Practices and Rhetoric, 10 BOLOGNA CTR. J. INT’L
AFFS. 21, 26 (2007) (collecting scholarship).
69. Claussen & Nichol, supra note 68 (summarizing different terminology used in the literature).
70. Crawford, supra note 67, at 132 (describing the European Union as a pooling of sovereignty);
Ku & Yoo, supra note 45, at 210 (discussing the phenomena of nation-states “delegating authority to
international organizations” and being bound by the law they create); Zamir & Barker, supra note 44
(“By entering into [investment treaties], States consent to delegate some of their sovereignty to an
international tribunal . . . .”).
71. See Slaughter, supra note 58 (explaining that the disaggregation of national states has
resulted in their component government institutions each exercising “a measure of sovereignty”).
72. See, e.g., James D. Wilets, A Unified Theory of International Law, the State, and the
Individual: Transnational Legal Harmonization in the Context of Economic and Legal Globalization,
31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 753, 819 (2010) (noting that in many countries lawmaking power is “flowing
downward to the local level with respect to issues of local concern”).
73. See, e.g., Patrick Thornberry, Ethnic Dimensions of International Human Rights, in A
HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 355, 376 (Angela Hegarty & Siobhan Leonard
eds., 1999) (“It has been widely observed that sovereignty is leaking out from the State in two
directions—towards supranational organisations and to sub-State or sub-national groups. Sovereignty
is less concentrated than before and more amorphous.”).
74. SHELEFF, supra note 61, at 6 (asserting that if a state allows tribal peoples to maintain their
own customs rather than absorbing them within larger state frameworks, the state is thereby “shar[ing]
its rule-making and rule-enforcing power” with these communities).
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way that the Americas were a “New” World: from the perspective of those
late to realizing their existence.
That being said, there is no question that sovereignty as understood
in international law is evolving and is becoming less monolithic than it
once was asserted to be. The analysis that follows seeks to build upon the
existing literature by offering further insights into how the international
legal norm of sovereignty is changing and, in particular, how sovereignty
is being shared and how different forms of sovereignty-sharing interact
with one another.
II. THE PROLIFERATION OF PARTICIPATION RIGHTS AND THEIR
ESSENTIAL ROLE IN THE LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN
AUTHORITY
Sovereignty is sometimes described as a collection of “rights” held
by the state. As characterized by Samantha Besson:
Among sovereignty rights, one usually finds listed the following
rights: plenary territorial and personal jurisdiction within one’s
territorial boundaries; the presumption of legality of one’s sovereign
acts; constitutional and organizational autonomy including selfdetermination; and the protection of one’s domaine réservé [or
freedom from external interference].75

Within these rights, the state’s plenary jurisdiction over persons and
territory includes the authority to prescribe and enforce laws to govern
conduct within the state’s territory, as well as control over natural
resources.76 As already discussed, states regularly divide up and share this
jurisdiction and other rights of sovereignty, such as when they sign treaties
that limit their regulatory discretion, confer adjudicatory power on
international tribunals, or grant subnational authorities control over
aspects of governance.
Yet the carving up of sovereignty is not limited to the extension of
governance rights to new actors. I submit that states also share sovereignty
by creating “participation rights”: opportunities to choose the officials
who will wield governance rights, take part directly in the processes of
75. Besson, supra note 6, ¶ 118; see also id. ¶ 122 (explaining that the protection of a state’s
domaine réservé refers to “freedom from external interference and intervention”).
76. Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 123 (2010) (“Territorial jurisdiction connotes the
application of legal rules within territorial space, and it is the most widely accepted source of a nationstate’s authority to make, enforce, and adjudicate legal rules.”); Adeno Addis, The Thin State in Thick
Globalism: Sovereignty in the Information Age, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 37 (2004) (“One of
the elements that has traditionally been viewed as constitutive of sovereignty under international law
and political theory is the state’s capacity to have control over the natural resources found within its
territorial jurisdiction.”).
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governance, or receive a share of state resources. The discussion that
follows will show how states are creating such opportunities in
unprecedented ways and at an accelerating rate, both internationally and
domestically. This phenomenon reflects a growing acceptance not only of
popular sovereignty but more specifically of the Participation Principle
and its premise that participation rights are essential to the legitimate
exercise of governmental authority.
A. The Participation Principle at the International Level
The international community’s embrace of the Participation
Principle is reflected in a wide range of international instruments,
standards, and human rights court decisions, which have emerged in stages
from the immediate aftermath of World War II to the present.
1. Early Documents: The UDHR, the ICCPR, the American Convention,
and the African Charter
An embryonic version of the Participation Principle is expressed in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the UN
General Assembly in 1948.77 Article 21 of the Declaration proclaims:
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his
country.
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of
government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be
held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.78

This shows that as early as 1948 the international community
identified the vital importance of public participation in governance and
access to state benefits, and also recognized that governmental authority
depends on the will of the people.
Article 21 of the UDHR has been echoed closely in several
subsequent human rights instruments. These instruments include the
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted in
1966 and eventually signed by nearly all states; 79 the American
Convention on Human Rights (American Convention), adopted in 1969
77. UDHR, supra note 36.
78. Id. art. 21.
79. ICCPR, supra note 37. For state signatures and ratifications, see Status of Ratification
Interactive Dashboard: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. OFF. HIGH
COMM’R HUM. RTS., http://indicators.ohchr.org [https://perma.cc/LY9K-MCAM].
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and ratified by twenty-five countries;80 and the African Charter, adopted
in 1983 and ratified by fifty-three countries.81 Each of these instruments
recognizes essentially the same rights as Article 21 of the UDHR, with
only minor differences in wording.82
In addition to enshrining the foregoing rights, the ICCPR and the
African Charter both articulate certain rights of “peoples.” In particular,
they provide that peoples have a right to self-determination, which
includes the subsidiary rights to decide their own political status,
determine their own development priorities, and freely dispose of their
natural wealth and resources.83 The African Charter adds yet another right:
a right of peoples to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their
development.84
It is a matter of debate whether the term “peoples” in these
instruments refers only to the entire populations of states, or also includes
subnational peoples, such as the Québécois of Canada or the Endorois of
Kenya.85 Yet there is growing support for the proposition that subnational
peoples enjoy at least a limited right to self-determination, which is short
of a right to independence.86 What this “internal” version of self80. American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica” (B-32), Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American
Convention]. For state signatures and ratifications, see American Convention on Human Rights, ORG.
OF AM. STATES, https://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_b-32_american_convention_on_human_rights_
sign.htm [https://perma.cc/Y2DQ-E4VM].
81. African Charter, supra note 12. For state signatures and ratifications, see Ratification Table:
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS.,
https://www.achpr.org/ratificationtable?id=49 [https://perma.cc/QKU9-ZVB2].
82. See ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 25 (every citizen has the right to “take part in the conduct of
public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives”; “vote and to be elected at genuine
periodic elections”; and “have access, on general terms of equality, to public service”); American
Convention, supra note 80, art. 23 (identical to ICCPR art. 25); African Charter, supra note 12, art.
13 (asserting that every citizen has the right to “participate freely in the government of his country,
either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law”;
and to have equal access to public service and public property).
83. ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 1; African Charter, supra note 12, arts. 20, 21.
84. African Charter, supra note 12, art. 24.
85. See David Wippman, International Law and Ethnic Conflict on Cyprus, 31 T EX. INT’L L.J.
141, 170 (1996) (“[S]cholars have debated whether subnational groups within recognized states could
also constitute ‘peoples’ entitled to claim self-determination.”); Glen Anderson, A Post-Millennial
Inquiry into the United Nations Law of Self-Determination: A Right to Unilateral Non-Colonial
Secession?, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1183, 1249–52 (2016) (discussing claims to selfdetermination by the peoples of Québec and Scotland); Endorois Case, supra note 14, ¶¶ 146–47
(noting disagreement over whether the Endorois are a “people” within the meaning of the ICCPR and
the African Charter).
86. Geoff Gilbert, Autonomy and Minority Groups: A Right in International Law?, 35 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 307, 325 n.84 (2002) (collecting authority expressing the view that all peoples within the
state have a right to internal self-determination); DAVID RAIČ, STATEHOOD AND THE LAW OF SELFDETERMINATION 285 (2002) (presenting evidence of state practice reflecting a right to internal selfdetermination).
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determination involves is unsettled, but possibilities range from autonomy
or self-government—governance rights—to meaningful participation in
governance and state-controlled benefits—participation rights.87
As the discussion above shows, all four of these pivotal early
documents recognize some version of the Participation Principle. Namely,
each enshrines a right of citizens to participate in governance either
directly or indirectly, as well as a right to access state services or property.
Two of these instruments also articulate rights held collectively by
subnational peoples that likewise confer participation opportunities, if not
also the prospect of controlling aspects of governance.88
The inclusion of these rights of individuals and peoples in the UDHR
and the ICCPR is particularly significant because both are widely regarded
as expressing customary international law, at least in large part.89 Although
some argue that the language requiring free and fair elections is ignored
too often to qualify as a customary norm,90 the other rights stand on firmer
ground.91 As examined below, the international community has endorsed
these rights in myriad ways since the adoption of these early instruments,
strengthening their claim to being part of customary international law.

87. RAIČ, supra note 86, at 237–39 (noting that most scholars support the view that internal selfdetermination denotes participation in decision-making, “ranging from direct participation in the
central decision-making processes of the State, to federalism and other forms of political autonomy”);
see also Endorois Case, supra note 14 (holding that the Endorois and other subnational peoples have
rights to be consulted in connection with decision-making processes and share in the benefits of
development activities).
88. ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 1; African Charter, supra note 12, arts. 20, 21.
89. Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and
International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 287, 317–51 (1996) (collecting scholarly works and
statements by states and international organizations reflecting the view that the UDHR expresses
customary international law in whole or in substantial part).
90. Crawford, supra note 67, at 130 (“We are far from having a democratic guarantee. Article
25 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights . . . . is a pale shadow of such a
guarantee.”); Alvin Y.H. Cheung, Road to Nowhere: Hong Kong’s Democratization and China’s
Obligations Under Public International Law, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 465, 524 (2015) (“[I]t is doubtful
that a right to democracy per se—as formulated in Article 21(3) of the UDHR or otherwise—has
attained the status of customary international law.”).
91. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (2d ed. 2004)
(explaining that self-determination, as expressed in Article 1 of the ICCPR, is “widely acknowledged
to be a principle of customary international law and even jus cogens, a peremptory norm”); Ludsin,
supra note 9, at 114–15 (arguing that the UDHR’s language on popular sovereignty and the ICCPR’s
on self-determination reflect customary international norms); Damrosch, supra note 10, at 40–41
(collecting evidence in favor of a customary international law right to participate in political
governance that does not necessarily require free and fair elections).
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2. 1986–1992: Elaborating the Principle in the Contexts of Development,
the Environment, and Vulnerable Groups
Not long after the adoption of the African Charter, a flurry of drafting
activity occurred in a six-year period that resulted in a series of instruments
addressing public participation in governance. These instruments included
the UN Declaration on the Right to Development,92 the Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples Convention,93 the Convention on Environmental Impact
Assessment in a Transboundary Context (the Espoo Convention),94 and a
collection of documents signed at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro.95
These documents went beyond their predecessors by calling for specific
forms of participation in connection with development and the
environment, as well as enhanced participation rights for vulnerable and
marginalized groups.
It was no coincidence that these instruments emerged when they did.
By the late 1980s, the international community was beginning to
understand the serious environmental and social costs of unchecked
development, and the inequitable manner in which the benefits of
development are often distributed.96 States were also coming to appreciate
the unique vulnerabilities of Indigenous and traditional communities to
impacts of development,97 as well as the inestimable value of their
traditional knowledge and genetic resources, which, once lost, could never
be replaced.98 Participation rights on the part of these communities and
other stakeholders were seen as vital to confronting the growing
challenges to the planet and to global society.
a. The UN Declaration on the Right to Development
The first document created during this fertile period was the UN
Declaration on the Right to Development,99 adopted by the UN General

92. G.A. Res. 41/128, Declaration on the Right to Development (Dec. 4, 1986) [hereinafter
UNDRD].
93. Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, supra note 13.
94. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Feb. 25,
1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309 (entered into force Sept. 10, 1997) [hereinafter Espoo Convention].
95. See infra Section II.A.2.d and the sources cited therein.
96. World Comm’n on Env’t and Dev., Report of the World Commission on Environment and
Development: Our Common Future, ch. 1, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (1987) (addressing an urgent call
by the UN General Assembly for an international agenda for a new approach to economic
development, which should integrate development with resource conservation and provide “adequate
livelihoods and equitable access to resources” to all).
97. Id. ch. 4, ¶¶ 70−78.
98. Id. ch. 4, ¶ 74.
99. UNDRD, supra note 91.
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Assembly in 1986 by a vote of 146 to 1.100 The Declaration was a product
of a movement within developing countries to achieve a “New
International Economic Order” (NIEO): a set of reforms intended to
ensure their sovereignty over natural resources and promote a more even
distribution of income and development among states.101 Toward that end,
the Declaration calls for “[s]ustained action . . . to promote more rapid
development of developing countries,”102 in addition to endorsing other
goals of the NIEO movement.103 Significantly, however, the Declaration
also addresses participatory rights of individuals and distributional equity
within states.
Specifically, the Declaration provides that states have a duty to
formulate policies that promote individuals’ “active, free and meaningful
participation in development and in the fair distribution of the benefits
resulting therefrom.”104 This language reflects a concern raised in a report
by UN Special Rapporteur Raúl Ferrero in the lead up to the Declaration’s
adoption:
[T]here would be no real point in restructuring the international order
for the benefit of the developing countries if the fruits of that reform
did not prove beneficial to the vast majorities whose needs are the
greatest . . . ; in other words, greater internal distributional justice
must be achieved in the developing countries so that the ultimate
beneficiaries of the drive for a new world order will be the people
themselves.105

Ferrero also highlighted a tendency of some governments to devote
state resources to purposes that do not meaningfully benefit the people,
such as military spending.106 Accordingly, in calling on states to adopt
100. U.N. OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RTS., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON THE
RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 17 (2016).
101. See ISABELLA D. BUNN, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW: LEGAL AND MORAL DIMENSIONS 36–37 (2012) (discussing the NIEO movement and its
connection to the Declaration); Anne Orford, Globalization and the Right to Development, in
PEOPLE’S RIGHTS 127, 131 (Philip Alston ed., 2001).
102. UNDRD, supra note 91, art. 4(2).
103. See UNDRD, supra note 91, art. 3(3) (calling on states to “promote a new international
economic order based on sovereign equality, interdependence, mutual interest and co-operation among
all States”); id. art. 1(2) (asserting that the right to develop requires respect for sovereignty over natural
wealth and resources).
104. Id. art. 2(3) (emphasis added).
105. Raúl Ferrero (Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection on Minorities), The New International Economic Order and the Promotion of Human
Rights, ¶ 152, UN. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/24/Rev.1 (1986) (emphasis added). For the influence of
Ferrero’s report on the UNDRD, see BUNN, supra note 100, at 39.
106. Ferrero, supra note 104, ¶ 271 (“Let us imagine for a moment what it would mean if the
huge resources devoted to military ends were used for civilian purposes. How much could be achieved
and how many development programmes could be launched?”).
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policies to promote individuals’ participation in development and in the
fair distribution of its benefits, the General Assembly contemplated, at
least in part, an equitable sharing of state resources.
Finally, the Declaration underscores that special efforts may be
needed to overcome barriers to participation in development and its
benefits. It does so by calling for effective measures “to ensure that women
have an active role in the development process,” and to otherwise address
“social injustices.”107
b. The Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention
The Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, adopted in 1989
under the auspices of the International Labor Organization,108 echoes and
elaborates upon themes of the UN Declaration on the Right to
Development in the specific context of Indigenous and tribal peoples.
Among the rights enshrined in the Convention are some that arguably
constitute governance rights. One of these is a right of Indigenous and
tribal peoples “to decide their own priorities for the process of
development . . . and to exercise control, to the extent possible, over their
own economic, social and cultural development.”109 This language
suggests not mere participation in development-related decisions, but
actual control. The Convention also establishes a right of Indigenous and
tribal peoples “to retain their own customs and institutions, where these
are not incompatible with fundamental rights defined by the national legal
system and with internationally recognised human rights.” 110 This too is
arguably a governance right because it gives the people’s customs the
force of law.
The Convention provides further that when the state retains control
over aspects of governance, Indigenous and tribal peoples must be
afforded participation rights. The participation rights announced include
the right to be consulted by state authorities “whenever consideration is
being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect
them directly”;111 the right to “freely participate . . . at all levels of
decision-making in elective institutions and administrative and other
bodies responsible for policies and programmes which concern them”;112

107. UNDRD, supra note 92, art. 8(1).
108. Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, supra note 13.
109. Id. art. 7(1) (emphasis added).
110. Id. art. 8(2); see also id. art. 9(1) (“To the extent compatible with the national legal system
and internationally recognised human rights, the methods customarily practised by the peoples
concerned for dealing with offences committed by their members shall be respected.”).
111. Id. art. 6.
112. Id.
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the right to cooperate in environmental and social impact assessments;113
the right “to participate in the use, management and conservation of” local
natural resources;114 and the right to “wherever possible participate in the
benefits of such activities.”115 Finally, the Convention provides that states
should refrain from activities that would require the people’s relocation,
absent their free and informed consent.116
The Convention has been adopted by twenty-three countries,117
making its governance and participation rights binding obligations for a
significant cross-section of the international community.118
c. The Espoo Convention
The Espoo Convention, adopted in 1991, identifies specific
participation rights that states should accord to affected groups or
individuals in a particular context: when states are performing
environmental impact assessments (EIAs) in connection with activities
likely to have significant adverse transboundary impact.119 Notably, the
Convention requires member states to provide “an opportunity to the
public in the areas likely to be affected [by the proposed activity] to
participate in relevant environmental impact assessment procedures.”120
The Convention adds that this opportunity shall include a right of “the
public of the affected Party in the areas likely to be affected be informed
of, and be provided with possibilities for making comments or objections
on, the proposed activity.”121
The Espoo Convention has since been ratified by forty-five states and
the European Union.122 As a result, its participation requirements

113. Id. art. 7(3)–(4).
114. Id. art. 15(1).
115. Id. art. 15(2).
116. Id. art. 16(2).
117. For a list of ratifications, see Int’l Labour Org., Ratifications of C169 - Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), INT’L LABOUR ORG., https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en
/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314 [https://perma.cc/VP2C34RN].
118. The Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention does not, however, create an enforcement
mechanism for these rights. See Jernej Letnar Cernic, State Obligations Concerning Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights to Their Ancestral Lands: Lex Imperfecta?, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1129, 1168
(2013) (noting the absence of an enforcement mechanism in the Convention).
119. Espoo Convention, supra note 93.
120. Id. art. 2(6).
121. Id. art. 3(8).
122. For a list of ratifications, see UN Econ. Comm. for Europe, Convention on Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) in a Transboundary Context, Status of Ratifications, UN ECON. COMM. FOR
EUR., https://unece.org/fileadmin//DAM/env/eia/ratification.htm [https://perma.cc/DUD8-H5SP].
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constitute binding international obligations in a band of countries
stretching from North America across Europe to Central Asia.123
d. The Earth Summit Documents
On the heels of the agreements discussed above, the representatives
of 178 countries met in 1992 at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro.124
There, they adopted an assortment of documents: the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development (the Rio Declaration);125 Agenda 21;126 the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC);127 the Forest
Principles;128 and the Convention on Biological Diversity129 (collectively
the Earth Summit Documents). These documents together offered the most
comprehensive expressions of the Participation Principle yet.
Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration notably calls for public
participation in a broad range of environmental matters: access to
information, participation in decision-making, and access to judicial and
administrative remedies.130 Principle 22 of the Declaration also reinforces
the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention by providing that
“Indigenous people and their communities and other local communities
have a vital role in environmental management,” and that “[s]tates should
recognize and duly support their identity, culture and interests and enable
their effective participation in the achievement of sustainable
development.”131
123. Id. (see map). The Espoo Convention also establishes a framework to promote compliance,
although it is relatively weak because it relies on state willingness to commit to binding dispute
resolution. See Angela Z. Cassar & Carl E. Bruch, Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment
in International Watercourse Management, 12 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 169, 198–99 (2003) (“If a dispute
arises between two or more parties regarding the interpretation or application of the Espoo Convention,
the Parties are encouraged to negotiate, though they maintain the option to submit their dispute to the
International Court of Justice or request arbitration.” (emphasis added)); Espoo Convention, supra
note 94, art. 15(2) (explaining that when ratifying the Convention, a party may declare in writing that
it accepts one of the specified mechanisms for binding dispute resolution).
124. Robert V. Percival, Global Law and the Environment, 86 WASH. L. REV. 579, 586 (2011).
125. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
151/5, 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
126. Agenda 21, U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21].
127. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S.
107 (entered into force March 21, 1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC].
128. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 3–14, 1992, Non-Legally
Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management,
Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol.
III), Annex III (Aug. 14, 1992) [hereinafter Forests Principles].
129. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79, 79 (entered into force
Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter CBD].
130. Rio Declaration, supra note 123, at princ. 10.
131. Id. at princ. 22.
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Agenda 21, the framework for implementing the Rio Declaration,
sets forth more detailed language on both themes. It advocates specific
forms of participation in environmental decision-making and benefitsharing, as well as affirmative steps to ensure participation by Indigenous
communities and other vulnerable groups. It calls in particular for:
• “[I]ncreased local control of resources, local institutionstrengthening and capacity-building and greater
involvement of non-governmental organizations and local
levels of government as delivery mechanisms”;132
•

“[E]mpowerment of local and community groups
through the principle of delegating authority,
accountability and resources to the most appropriate
level”;133

•

“Promoting or establishing grass-roots mechanisms to
allow for the sharing of experience and knowledge,” and
otherwise “[g]iving communities a large measure of
participation in the sustainable management and
protection of the local natural resources”;134 and

•

“[T]he active participation of those affected in the
decision-making and implementation process, especially
of groups that have, hitherto, often been excluded, such
as women, youth, indigenous people and their
communities and other local communities.”135

Another Earth Summit Document, the UNFCCC,136 mandates public
participation in connection with efforts to mitigate climate change.
Namely, it provides for the parties to the Convention to promote “public
participation in addressing climate change and its effects and developing
adequate responses.”137
The Forest Principles apply the participation concept to forest
management. Specifically, Principle 2 urges states to “provide
opportunities for the participation of interested parties, including local
communities and indigenous people, industries, labour, non-governmental
organizations and individuals, forest dwellers and women, in the
development, implementation and planning of national forest policies.”138
132. Agenda 21, supra note 125, ¶ 3.4.
133. Id. ¶ 3.5.
134. Id. ¶ 3.7.
135. Id. ¶ 10.10.
136. UNFCCC, supra note 126.
137. Id. art. 6(a)(iii); see also id. art. 4(1)(i) (expressing a commitment of the parties to
“encourage the widest participation in this process”).
138. Forest Principles, supra note 127, at princ. 2(d).
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Principle 5 further encourages states to ensure that “[I]ndigenous people,
their communities and other communities and forest dwellers . . . have an
economic stake in forest use.”139 Principle 12 adds that Indigenous
communities should receive an equitable share of the benefits arising from
the utilization of Indigenous knowledge.140
The Convention on Biological Diversity elaborates upon this latter
idea. It provides that traditional knowledge, innovation, and practices shall
be utilized only with the approval and involvement of local communities,
and upon equitable sharing of benefits.141 It also asserts that if states make
genetic resources available to third parties for commercial purposes, then
they should have a mechanism to share the economic benefits fairly and
equitably.142 Significantly, however, the Convention does not create
private property rights, but rather recognizes state sovereignty over
traditional knowledge and genetic resources.143 Accordingly, the rights
called for by the Convention arguably constitute governance rights if
domestic law confers control over these matters on local communities and
participation rights if it does not.
3. Subsequent Articulations in International Instruments, Guidelines, and
Human Rights Court Decisions
Since the whirlwind of drafting activity between 1986 and 1992,
numerous international instruments, guidelines, and human rights court
decisions have developed the Participation Principle even further. In
particular, they amplify language in earlier instruments, call for specific
participation rights in connection with aspects of governance not
previously addressed, and extend the obligations contemplated by the
principle to non-state actors.
a. Indigenous Rights Authority
Indigenous rights have made particularly dramatic strides. One of the
most important developments was the adoption of the UN Declaration on

139. Id. at princ. 5(a).
140. Id. at princ. 12(d).
141. CBD, supra note 128, art. 8(j).
142. Id. art. 15(7).
143. See Rebecca M. Bratspies, The New Discovery Doctrine: Some Thoughts on Property
Rights and Traditional Knowledge, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 315, 328 (2007) (noting that the
Convention “frames traditional knowledge and biological resources through the lens of state
sovereignty, and vests ownership of these resources in the state”); Gurdial Singh Nijar, Incorporating
Traditional Knowledge in an International Regime on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit
Sharing: Problems and Prospects, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 457, 465 (2010) (“Some states claim an
overriding ownership right to the genetic resources, referring to it as ‘the patrimony of the State.’”).
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the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007. 144 That instrument
reaffirms the governance and participation rights enshrined in the
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, and also goes beyond them.145
Among other things, UNDRIP expressly acknowledges Indigenous
peoples’ right to self-determination,146 with the caveat that this right
contemplates autonomy or self-government,147 rather than secession.148
Although UNDRIP is expressly non-binding, the Declaration
achieved near universal support in the UN General Assembly, and the few
countries that voted against it have since endorsed it.149 This suggests that
the rights it announces enjoy virtually unanimous support in the
international community, at least as a goal toward which states should
aspire.150
Further, in recent years human rights bodies have read the
participation concepts enshrined in UNDRIP and the Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples Convention into other human rights instruments and have
even expanded upon them. Specifically, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights has held that states may not authorize development
activities on the lands of Indigenous or traditional communities without
affirmatively consulting with these communities, as well as sharing
benefits with them if the activity goes forward.151 The Court has also held
144. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP].
145. See George K. Foster, Foreign Investment and Indigenous Peoples: Options for Promoting
Equilibrium Between Economic Development and Indigenous Rights, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 627, 664–
65 (2012) (summarizing the rights announced in UNDRIP); SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA,
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON THE ILO INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES CONVENTION NO. 169, UN
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (UNDRIP), AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’
RIGHTS ACT (IPRA) OF THE PHILIPPINES 6–61 (2012) (comparing UNDRIP, the Convention, and
similar Philippine legislation).
146. See UNDRIP, supra note 144, art. 3 (“Indigenous peoples have the right to selfdetermination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.”).
147. Id. art. 4 (“Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right
to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways
and means for financing their autonomous functions.”).
148. Id. art. 46 (asserting that nothing in the Declaration implies a right of any people, group, or
person to take any act that would dismember or impair the territorial integrity or political unity of
states).
149. Foster, supra note 145, at 667–68 (summarizing the votes and abstentions in the General
Assembly and subsequent endorsements by the countries that voted against the Declaration).
150. See Pereira & Gough, supra note 46, at 472 (“Although resolutions of the [UN General
Assembly] are not legally binding, in this case the UNDRIP was adopted by so many states with so
few objections and abstentions that it might very well attain the status of customary international
law.”); see also UNDRIP, supra note 144, pmbl. (asserting that the endorsing states solemnly proclaim
the Declaration to be “a standard of achievement to be pursued in a spirit of partnership and mutual
respect”).
151. Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶ 129–33
(Nov. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Saramaka Judgment].
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that if the activity would have a serious impact on such a community’s
lands, resources, or way of life, then the state must secure the community’s
consent before authorizing it. 152
The Court has inferred the need to comply with these safeguards
from rights and obligations expressed in the American Convention that are
not specific to Indigenous or traditional communities. These rights and
obligations include the right to property,153 the right to participate in
government,154 and an obligation of states to promote the progressive
development of economic, social, and cultural rights.155 According to the
Court, compliance with the relevant safeguards is essential to fulfilling
these requirements in the context of Indigenous and traditional
communities, given their unique attachment to the land and natural
resources and vulnerability to developmental impacts.156
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has
endorsed the same safeguards, grounding them in the African Charter’s
language on peoples’ collective rights to development, natural resources,
and a satisfactory environment.157
b. International Environmental Law
International environmental law has also significantly developed
further participation rights since the Earth Summit.
For example, the Aarhus Convention, a multilateral agreement
adopted in 1998, requires member states to establish a number of public
152. Id. ¶¶ 134–35; see also Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 185, ¶ 17 (Aug. 12, 2008).
153. Saramaka Judgment, supra note 151, ¶ 158 (finding that Suriname’s failure to comply with
the safeguards was a violation of the right to property set forth in Article 21 of the American
Convention).
154. Case of the Indigenous Communities of the Lhaka Honhat Association (Our Land) v.
Argentina, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 400, ¶ 173 (Feb. 6, 2020) (holding that
consultations are necessary to comply with the right to participate in government set forth in Article
23 of the American Convention).
155. Id. ¶¶ 287–89 (holding that Argentina violated an obligation to progressively realize rights,
as required by Article 26 of the American Convention, by allowing outsiders to engage in logging and
livestock grazing on the lands of an Indigenous community, without prior consultation).
156. See Saramaka Judgment, supra note 151, ¶¶ 82–86.
157. See Social & Economic Rights Action Center & Another v. Nigeria, Communication
155/96, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶¶ 1–10, 53–58
(May 27, 2002) (holding that Nigeria violated the Ogoni people’s rights to resources and to a
satisfactory environment by allowing oil operations on their territory without consultations and
benefit-sharing); Endorois Case, supra note 14, ¶¶ 267–68 (holding that Kenya violated the Endorois
people’s right to natural resources by failing to share benefits resulting from ruby mining on their
territory); id. ¶ 291 (holding that Kenya violated the Endorois’ right to development by failing to
consult with them and secure their free, prior and informed consent); id. ¶¶ 297–98 (holding that Kenya
failed to comply with the Endorois’ right to development by failing to share benefits from the creation
of a game reserve).
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participation opportunities relating to environmental matters.158
Specifically, members of the public must have access to certain types of
information about the environment,159 opportunities to participate in
environmental decision-making,160 and the ability to access the justice
system to enforce environmental laws or their own participation rights.161
The Aarhus Convention thus effectively converts Principle 10 of the Rio
Declaration into binding obligations for its forty-seven member states,
while also fleshing out the Rio Declaration’s comparatively vague
language. 162
Another example is the establishment of participation requirements
relating to REDD+, a climate change mitigation framework under the
UNFCCC. REDD+ channels funds from international donors to
developing countries to create financial incentives for them to curb
deforestation and improve forest management.163 The parties to the
UNFCCC recognize that some conservation efforts could have serious
costs for local communities that depend on forests for their livelihood,
notwithstanding the obvious ecological benefits to protecting forests.164
Accordingly, in 2013, the parties adopted the non-binding Cancún
Agreements, which call for safeguards to protect forest-dependent
communities.165 Namely, the Cancún Agreements provide that developing
country parties should “engage a broad range of stakeholders at the global,
regional, national and local levels,” and promote “[t]he full and effective
participation of relevant stakeholders, in particular indigenous peoples and
local communities” when preparing or implementing national action plans

158. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access
to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447 (entered into force Oct. 30,
2001) [hereinafter Aarhus Convention].
159. Id. arts. 4–5.
160. Id. arts. 6–8.
161. Id. art. 9.
162. Sarah Lamdan, Beyond FOIA: Improving Access to Environmental Information in the
United States, 29 GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 481, 502 (2017). For a list of member states see Status of
Ratification, UNCE, https://unece.org/environment-policy/public-participation/aarhus-convention/
status-ratification [https://perma.cc/Z6UF-32BV].
163. See Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, Decisions Report of the Conference of the
Parties on Its Fifteenth Session, at 11, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010)
(establishing REDD+); David Takacs, Environmental Democracy and Forest Carbon (REDD+), 44
ENV’T L. 71, 75–76 (2014) (describing the REDD+ framework).
164. Takacs, supra note 163, at 77–78 (highlighting the risk that “local people may be barred
from using forests to generate profits (e.g. through logging) or to sustain local communities (e.g.
through conversion to agricultural land or harvesting trees for building material.)”).
165. Cancún Climate Change Conference, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its
Sixteenth Session, at 2, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Cancún
Agreements]. The safeguards are set forth in Appendix I. See also Takacs, supra note 163, at 83–84
(describing the adoption of the safeguards).
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for REDD+.166 Parties should also ensure that their actions consider “the
need for sustainable livelihoods of indigenous peoples and local
communities and their interdependence on forests in most countries.”167
Since then, international organizations that provide funding to
REDD+ participating countries have developed their own standards to
implement the Cancún safeguards.168 Accordingly, these funding
gatekeepers now require participating countries to craft their national
action plans to facilitate engagement of forest-dependent communities and
benefit-sharing.169
Similarly, in 2010, the parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity adopted a protocol strengthening the Convention’s participation
requirements.170 Known as the Nagoya Protocol, it requires state parties to
adopt legislation to ensure that traditional knowledge associated with
genetic resources is accessed only with the prior and informed consent and
involvement of the holders of that knowledge.171 It also requires a
domestic legal framework to ensure that benefits arising from traditional
knowledge are shared fairly and equitably with the relevant
communities.172
c. Extension of Participation Requirements to Other Aspects of
Governance and to Non-State Actors
Recent decades have also witnessed a variety of international
initiatives to promote participation rights in aspects of governance beyond
development and the environment, as well as to extend participation
obligations to non-state actors.
For example, successive UN sustainable development summits have
produced outcome documents that not only affirmed the participation
goals in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, but also extended them to all
166. Cancún Agreements, supra note 165, app. I, ¶ 2(d).
167. Id. at app. I, ¶ 3(e) n.1.
168. See UN-REDD PROGRAMME & FOREST CARBON P’SHIP FACILITY, GUIDELINES ON
STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT IN REDD+ READINESS WITH A FOCUS ON THE PARTICIPATION OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND OTHER FOREST-DEPENDENT COMMUNITIES (Apr. 20, 2012) (outlining the
stakeholder engagement and benefit-sharing framework for United Nations and World Bank REDD+
programs).
169. SÉBASTIEN JODOIN, FOREST PRESERVATION IN A CHANGING CLIMATE: REDD+ AND
INDIGENOUS AND COMMUNITY RIGHTS IN INDONESIA AND TANZANIA 52 (2017) (describing
requirements for stakeholder engagement established by the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership
Facility and the UN-REDD Programme).
170. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY UNITED NATIONS, NAGOYA
PROTOCOL ON ACCESS TO GENETIC RESOURCES AND THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE SHARING OF
BENEFITS ARISING FROM THEIR UTILIZATION TO THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (Oct.
29, 2010) [hereinafter Nagoya Protocol].
171. Id. art. 7.
172. Id. art. 5(5).
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aspects of governance.173 The most recent of these documents is the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development, which announced the Sustainable
Development Goals.174 Goal 16 calls for states to achieve “access to justice
for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all
levels.”175 The associated targets include “effective, accountable and
transparent institutions at all levels”;176 “responsive, inclusive,
participatory and representative decision-making at all levels”;177 and
“public access to information.”178 This language notably encompasses all
governmental institutions and decision-making, not only those relating to
development and the environment.
Additionally, in 2012, a collection of UN agencies adopted the
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure (Tenure
Guidelines).179 The Tenure Guidelines likewise go beyond environmental
protection by seeking to ensure that interested groups and individuals have
access to land needed for agriculture, herding, or other purposes that
promote food security.180 Toward that end, the Tenure Guidelines call on
states to make stakeholder participation an integral element of state
decision-making on issues that may affect land tenure and access181 and to
share benefits derived from state-owned lands, fisheries, and forests.182
The Tenure Guidelines also call for heightened participation rights for
Indigenous peoples commensurate with UNDRIP.183 Similar language on
stakeholder participation is set forth in a different set of guidelines for
small-scale fisheries, adopted in 2015 and amended in 2018.184
Other non-binding guidelines extend the participation concept to the
private sector. Including the private sector is vital because states may leave
173. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 66/288, The Future We Want, at 3, (Sept. 11, 2012) (recognizing that
“opportunities for people to influence their lives and future, participate in decision-making and voice
their concerns are fundamental for sustainable development”).
174. G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
(Oct. 21, 2015).
175. Id. at 25.
176. Id. (Goal 16.6).
177. Id. (Goal 16.7).
178. Id. at 26 (Goal 16.10).
179. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. UNITED NATIONS, VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES ON THE RESPONSIBLE
GOVERNANCE OF TENURE OF LAND, FISHERIES AND FORESTS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL FOOD
SECURITY (2012) [hereinafter TENURE GUIDELINES].
180. See id. at iv. The overarching goal of the Tenure Guidelines are to achieve “food security
for all and support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national
food security.” Id.
181. See id. § 3B(6).
182. Id. § 8.6.
183. Id. § 9.9.
184. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. UNITED NATIONS, VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES FOR SECURING
SUSTAINABLE SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES IN THE CONTEXT OF FOOD SECURITY AND POVERTY
ERADICATION §§ 5.15, 5.10 (2d ed. 2018).
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it to private developers to carry out required consultations with local
communities likely to be affected by state-authorized projects,185 or use
developers as the vehicle through which benefits are delivered.186
Examples of international guidelines calling for businesses to ensure that
consultations or benefit-sharing take place include the OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises,187 the UN Guiding Principles for Business
and Human Rights,188 and the Principles for Responsible Investment in
Agriculture and Food Systems.189
In the same vein, the International Finance Corporation (IFC)—an
arm of the World Bank that offers financing to private clients—now
requires its borrowers to respect participation rights. Specifically, IFC
standards require that affected communities receive information about any
IFC-financed project and its potential impacts, be affirmatively consulted,
and in some cases receive a share of benefits.190 The standards provide
further that if the affected communities are Indigenous or practice a
traditional lifestyle and will experience certain significant impacts, then
the project may go forward only with community consent.191
d. A New Frontier in Participation: International Economic Law
One area in which participation rights have been slow to develop is
international economic law. Although trade and investment agreements
call for states to adapt their laws to conform to the agreements’
185. See, e.g., Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 199 (June 27, 2012) (“[T]he State . . . partially and inappropriately delegated its
obligation to consult to a private company, thereby failing to comply with . . . its obligation to
guarantee the Sarayaku People’s right to participation . . . .”).
186. See infra Section II.B.4.
187. OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011); see, e.g., id. at 20
(calling for multinational enterprises to “[e]ngage with relevant stakeholders in order to provide
meaningful opportunities for their views to be taken into account in relation to planning and decision
making for projects or other activities that may significantly impact local communities”); id. at 42
(urging MNEs to “engage in adequate and timely communication and consultation with the
communities directly affected by the environmental, health and safety policies of the enterprise and
by their implementation”).
188. UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMM’R, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (2011); see, e.g., id. § 18(b) and associated Commentary (calling for businesses to
engage in “meaningful consultation with potentially affected groups and other relevant stakeholders”
and “seek to understand the concerns of potentially affected stakeholders by consulting them
directly”).
189. COMM. ON WORLD FOOD SEC., PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT IN
AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SYSTEMS (2014); see, e.g., id. at princ. 9, ¶ 29 (asserting that responsible
investment should include “free, effective, meaningful and informed participation” in decision-making
by those directly affected by investment decisions, with particular efforts to promote participation by
Indigenous peoples and “the most vulnerable and marginalized”).
190. George K. Foster, Community Participation in Development, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
39, 78–79 (2018) (summarizing the participation requirements of the IFC standards).
191. Id.
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requirements and create tribunals charged with enforcing the parties’
obligations, originally these agreements established few or no
opportunities for members of the public to participate in these governance
functions.192 Nevertheless, incremental progress toward greater
participation began in the 1990s, and such progress has accelerated
lately.193
The growing emphasis on public participation can be seen in the
United States-Canada-Mexico Agreement (USMCA),194 which replaced
the North American Free Trade Agreement195 in 2020. The USMCA
mandates opportunities for members of the public to participate in a
variety of environmental matters, including the performance of EIAs196
and the implementation of the treaty’s environmental chapter.197 It also
provides for mechanisms to “enable small businesses to participate in
regulatory policy development” relating to such businesses.198 Further, the
parties to the USMCA pledge to create opportunities for small or medium
sized enterprises (SMEs) and businesses owned by underrepresented
groups—including women, Indigenous peoples, youth, and minorities—
to participate in trade and investment.199 This latter commitment arguably
reflects the benefit-sharing aspect of the Participation Principle. It does so
192. Frank Loy, Public Participation in the World Trade Organization, in THE WTO AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 113, 114–15 (Gary P. Sampson ed., 2005) (explaining that the WTO’s
initial dearth of participatory opportunities “contributed mightily to the ignorance, suspicion, and
hostility that the organization has engendered”); Chris Wold, Taking Stock: Trade’s Environmental
Scorecard After Twenty Years of “Trade and Environment,” 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 319, 324–26
(2010) (drawing contrast between transparency and participation opportunities available in
international environmental law, and those available in international economic law).
193. Wold, supra note 192, at 321 (identifying progress in promoting transparency, including
the growing practice of making dispute resolution submissions and decisions available).
194. OFF. U.S. TRADE REP., AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE
UNITED MEXICAN STATES, AND CANADA (Dec. 13, 2019) [hereinafter USMCA].
195. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., ch. 17, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
670 (1993).
196. USMCA, supra note 194, art. 24.7 (committing the member states to accord public
participation opportunities in connection with the performance of EIAs).
197. Id. art. 24.5 (providing for member states to provide information to the public and create
opportunities for members of the public to submit questions or comments relating to the
implementation of the environmental chapter). The treaty also affirms the importance of public
participation and consultation in connection with measures to protect the ozone layer, prevent marine
pollution, protect air quality, and conserve biological diversity. See id. arts. 24.9, 24.10, 24.11, 24.15.
198. Id. art. 15.10(2) (“[E]ach Party shall endeavor to adopt or maintain appropriate mechanisms
that consider the effects of regulatory actions on SME service suppliers and that enable small
businesses to participate in regulatory policy development.”).
199. Id. art. 25.2(b) (“[E]ach Party shall seek to increase trade and investment opportunities, and
in particular shall . . . promote SMEs owned by under-represented groups . . . and promote partnership
among these SMEs and their participation in international trade.”); id. art. 26.1(5)(c) (establishing a
Competitiveness Committee, one of whose responsibilities is to make “recommendations aimed at
enhancing the participation of SMEs, and enterprises owned by under-represented groups including
women, indigenous peoples, youth, and minorities”).
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because the standard way for states to encourage economic activity by
particular types of businesses is to grant them subsidies or tax credits, 200
and because market access secured by a treaty is itself a valuable economic
benefit.201 Accordingly, in agreeing to promote participation in trade and
investment by SMEs and businesses owned by underrepresented groups,
the member states were in effect contemplating the targeted use of state
resources to ensure that these entities enjoy the benefits produced by these
treaties.202
The USMCA also promotes public participation in dispute resolution
processes by requiring that the public have access to documents and be
able to attend hearings in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
proceedings.203 Further, it provides opportunities for persons or entities
who are not parties to an ISDS proceeding to submit amicus curiae
filings.204 These participatory avenues have relatively become common in
ISDS and WTO dispute resolution proceedings in recent years.205 As a
result, members of the public, Indigenous groups, and others are better
able to follow the proceedings and share insights into how the claims at
issue could impact their interests, the environment, or the public more
generally.206
During the USMCA negotiations, Canada pushed for even more
extensive participation opportunities. Specifically, Canada sought a
committee comprised of Indigenous representatives from all three member

200. Ana Teresa Tavares-Lehmann, Perrine Toledano, Lise Johnson & Lisa Sachs, Introduction,
in RETHINKING INVESTMENT INCENTIVES: TRENDS AND POLICY OPTIONS 1, 3–4 (Ana Teresa TavaresLehmann, Perrine Toledano, Lise Johnson & Lisa Sachs eds., 2016) (identifying financial incentives
used by governments to promote investment, many of which are “tailored to specific investors or types
of investors”).
201. See Chris Brummer, Regional Integration and Incomplete Club Goods: A Trade
Perspective, 8 CHIC. J. INT’L L. 535, 541 (2008) (“By creating a common market to which members
enjoy special preferential access, . . . members [of regional trade agreements] are able to draw on each
other’s markets to the advantage of their home state exporters.”).
202. The parties have already agreed to one such form of assistance: foregoing tariffs on
Indigenous handicraft goods to promote exports by Indigenous artisans. USMCA, supra note 19, art.
6.2.
203. Id. art. 14.D.8.
204. Id. art. 14.D.7(3).
205. Fernando Dias Simões, Amicus Curiae in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 54 AM. BUS. L.J.
161, 167–78 (2017) (discussing the trend toward increasing transparency and the emergence of amicus
curiae submissions in investment arbitration). See generally Theresa Squatrito, Amicus Curiae Briefs
in the WTO DSM: Good or Bad News for Non-State Actor Involvement?, 17 WORLD TRADE REV. 65
(2018) (same for WTO dispute resolution).
206. Valentina Vadi, Heritage, Power, and Destiny: The Protection of Indigenous Heritage in
International Investment Law and Arbitration, 50 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 725, 761–65 (2018)
(providing examples of Indigenous groups and NGOs filing amicus submissions in ISDS
proceedings); Squatrito, supra note 205 (cataloging amicus submissions in WTO cases).
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states to monitor the implementation of the agreement.207 A requirement
for such a committee was not ultimately adopted, but Canada did secure a
general exception providing that nothing in the USMCA shall prevent a
member state from enacting measures that it considers necessary to respect
its obligations toward Indigenous peoples.208 Canada insisted on that
safeguard to ensure that member states would have leeway to respect
Indigenous rights like those enshrined in UNDRIP, without being found
liable for breaching treaty obligations.209 As discussed previously,
UNDRIP contemplates extensive governance and participation
rights for Indigenous peoples. Accordingly, the USMCA offers protection
for these rights, at least to the extent these rights are incorporated into
domestic law.210
e. Multilayered Participation
The foregoing discussion about trade and investment agreements
highlights the multilayered way in which the Participation Principle is now
manifesting itself at the international level. States and international
organizations are no longer merely adopting international authority that
calls for participation rights in domestic governance. They are increasingly
affording participation opportunities for international governance as well,
including the drafting and implementation of international authority. Such
participation has become particularly common in the areas of international
environmental law,211 sustainable development,212 and international
207. Risa Schwartz, Developing a Trade and Indigenous Peoples Chapter for International
Trade Agreements, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 248, 265 (John Borrows &
Risa Schwartz eds., 2020).
208. USMCA, supra note 194, art. 32.5; Schwartz, supra note 207, at 264–66 (discussing
Canada’s role in the inclusion of the provision).
209. Schwartz, supra note 207, at 266 (“[T]his new general exception makes it clear to states
and foreign investors that USMCA parties are free to meet their legal obligations to Indigenous peoples
without concern that such actions may run afoul of trade or investment rules,” and that these legal
obligations arguably include the rights set forth in UNDRIP); id. at 264 (noting that Canada advocated
an express reference to UNDRIP in the USMCA).
210. Kevin O’Callaghan, Emilie Bundock & Madison Grist, USMCA Aims to Protect
the Interests of Indigenous Peoples in International Trade, FASKEN (Oct. 22, 2018),
https://www.fasken.com/en/knowledge/2018/10/van-usmca-aims-to-protect-the-interests-ofindigenous-peoples-in-international-trade/ [https://perma.cc/SJG6-W7RS] (explaining that efforts are
underway in Canada to formally incorporate UNDRIP into domestic law, so that “obligations under
UNDRIP may fall under the protection of the general exception—as legal obligations to Indigenous
peoples—even absent any direct reference in the USMCA”).
211. Wold, supra note 192, at 325–26 (“Within international environmental
regimes . . . environmentalists may obtain official documents, attend meetings of the parties as
observers, make interventions on the floor of the meeting, and even participate in direct negotiation of
resolutions and other treaty documents.”).
212. United Nations Dep’t Econ. & Soc. Affs., Major Groups and Other Stakeholders, UNITED
NATIONS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/majorgroups.html
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human rights law.213 As just seen, it is beginning to be featured in
international economic law as well.
In fact, public participation in international governance has become
so routine that Nahuel Maisley recently argued that civil society groups
already possess a “right to participate in international law-making.”214 He
grounds this asserted right in Article 25 of the ICCPR and its language that
all citizens have a right to participate in public affairs.215 Although Article
25 historically has been construed to relate only to domestic
governance,216 the trend that Maisley identifies is a real one. It is part of
the wider pattern described in this Article: the international community’s
increasing embrace of a Participation Principle that requires participation
by relevant stakeholders in all or most aspects of governance.
Accordingly, one might say that the Participation Principle now
manifests at the international level like a set of Russian nesting dolls. For
states or international organizations to create new authority, they typically
feel obliged to have public participation in the drafting process. Then the
authority they adopt reflects the Participation Principle by calling for the
creation of new participation rights. Thereafter, there is usually
participation to monitor the implementation of the relevant international
authority. Stakeholder involvement is thus viewed as so fundamental that
there must be participation upon participation upon participation.
B. The Participation Principle in Domestic Laws and Regulations
The Participation Principle has become just as firmly entrenched
within domestic systems worldwide, even if the nature and quality of
participation rights vary from country to country. As discussed in greater
detail below, diverse forms of participation have made dramatic gains in
recent decades across the spectrum of political systems. Many of the new
participation opportunities are precisely the sort contemplated by the
ICCPR, the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, the Rio
Declaration, and other authorities highlighted in Part II.A. Others are
distinctly original.
[https://perma.cc/GXC5-METQ] (discussing the role of civil society in the drafting and follow-up of
sustainable development commitments, from Agenda 21 to the Sustainable Development Goals).
213. Lillian Aponte Miranda, Indigenous Peoples as International Lawmakers, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L
L. 203, 232–43 (2010) (describing the extensive role played by Indigenous peoples in the drafting and
implementation of Indigenous rights instruments); Nahuel Maisley, The International Right of Rights?
Article 25(a) of the ICCPR as a Human Right to Take Part in International Law-Making, 28 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 89, 98 (2017) (asserting that civil society has had a voice in every law-making venue in
international human rights law).
214. Maisley, supra note 213, at 101.
215. Id. at 91 (citing ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 25).
216. Id. (citing authority for this proposition).
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1. Voting Rights
One form of participation that has spread rapidly is the opportunity
for citizens to play a part in choosing their leaders. At the start of the
twentieth century there were only a few democracies in the world, 217 and
even as late as 1974 there were still only 39.218 Yet by 2006, the number
of democracies had surpassed the number of autocracies,219 and Freedom
House currently places the tally at 114 to 80 in favor of democracies.220
It must be acknowledged that the last decade has witnessed
significant backsliding toward authoritarianism in some quarters,221 and
even countries that meet minimum standards of free and fair elections do
not necessarily protect other civil liberties.222 Nevertheless, there is no
question that there are many more political systems that feature
meaningful voting rights today than there were only a few decades ago.
2. Public Participation in Environmental Decision-Making and
Enforcement
In addition to increasing opportunities to help choose the leaders who
perform governance roles, alternative forms of participation have been
created in many domestic systems. Environmental governance is one area
that has seen extensive growth.
For example, more than 100 countries have adopted domestic EIA
regimes, which typically provide for some form of public participation in
the EIA process.223 Dozens of countries have also adopted mechanisms for
public access to the justice system to aid in the enforcement of
environmental laws.224 Some countries took these steps to implement the
217. Ronald Inglehart & Christian Welzel, How Development Leads to Democracy: What We
Know About Modernization, FOREIGN AFFS., March/April 2009, at 33, 34 (“At the start of the
twentieth century, only a handful of democracies existed, and even they fell short of being full
democracies by today’s standards.”).
218. Amichai Magen, The Rule of Law and Its Promotion Abroad: Three Problems of Scope, 45
STAN. J. INT’L L. 51, 67 (2009).
219. Id. at 66–67 (discussing Freedom House statistics in 2006).
220. See Sarah Repucci, A Leaderless Struggle for Democracy, FREEDOM HOUSE (2020),
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2020/leaderless-struggle-democracy [https://
perma.cc/2CMC-5VK9] (download Excel Data List) (categorizing 114 countries as democracies and
80 as non-democracies).
221. Id. (discussing a pattern of reduced rights in many countries),
222. Magen, supra note 218, at 67.
223. NEIL CRAIK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT:
PROCESS, SUBSTANCE AND INTEGRATION 23 (2008) (describing the proliferation of EIA regimes
globally and their typical requirements); id. at 31 (“Almost every EIA system includes some form of
public participation and consultation.”).
224. Jason J. Czarnezki, Lin Yanmei & Cameron F. Field, Global Environmental Law: Food
Safety & China, 25 GEO. INT’L ENV’T L. REV. 261, 285–86 (2013) (noting that recent innovations in
China have increased access to justice and resulted in a series of “ground-breaking environmental
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Aarhus Convention or Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration,225 while others
had already established these mechanisms before adopting those
instruments.226
Of course, the fact that participation opportunities nominally exist in
a country’s legal system does not necessarily mean they are faithfully
implemented or that they go far enough. Members of the public may incur
significant barriers to participating in environmental decision-making, feel
unable to share their genuine views, or be manipulated by those in charge
of the process.227 Officials may also fail to give sufficient weight to
whatever public input is provided.228 In addition, there may be severe
limits on standing for citizen environmental suits or prohibitive litigation
and opportunity costs that deter this form of participation.229
Despite these limitations and the need for ongoing reform, the rapid
spread of participation rights in environmental governance is impressive.
These rights have been widely credited with improving the quality and
legitimacy of decision-making and enforcement in places where they have
public interest cases against both polluters and inactive government agencies that were brought by
environmental NGOs on behalf of the public”); George (Rock) Pring & Catherine (Kitty) Pring,
Twenty-First Century Environmental Dispute Resolution: Is There an “ECT” in Your Future?, 33 J.
ENERGY & NAT. RES. L. 10, 10 (2015) (identifying more than 800 specialized environmental courts
or tribunals at every level of government and in every major legal system); id. at 19 (“The clear
trend . . . is to create more open standing for persons or groups with arguable environmental
concerns”).
225. Pring & Pring, supra note 224, at 14–15 (discussing the influence of the Aarhus Convention
and Principle 10).
226. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 904–06 (2002) (discussing the
enactment of EIA legislation in the United States in 1969, which inspired similar legislation around
the globe); David E. Adelman & Robert L. Glicksman, Reevaluating Environmental Citizen Suits in
Theory and Practice, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 385, 393 (2020) (“The creation of broad citizen suit
provisions was among the most important innovations in the groundbreaking [U.S.] federal
environmental legislation passed in the 1970s.”).
227. See, e.g., David W. Case, The Role of Information in Environmental Justice, 81 MISS. L.J.
701, 718 (2012) (identifying barriers to participation by low-income and minority communities in in
the United States); Sibo Chen, Power, Apathy, and Failure of Participation: How Local Voices on
Environmental Issues Are Muted in a Chinese Rural Context, SAGE OPEN, January–March 2017, at
1, 3 (2017) (ordinary citizens in China may decline to participate in environmental decision-making
processes “as a result of fears of the government’s hostility against opposing voices”); Taako Edema
George, Kiemo Karatu & Andama Edward, An Evaluation of the Environmental Impact Assessment
Practice in Uganda: Challenges and Opportunities for Achieving Sustainable Development, 6
HELIYON 1, 6–8 (2020) (identifying concerns including low rates of participation, failure to translate
information, and manipulation of participants).
228. See Chen, supra note 227, at 1.
229. George (Rock) Pring & Catherine (Kitty) Pring, Specialized Environmental Courts and
Tribunals at the Confluence of Human Rights and the Environment, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L. 301, 317–
18 (2009) (highlighting barriers to the pursuit of citizen environmental suits in domestic systems
around the world, including limits on standing that “exclude important constituencies with a real stake”
and high costs such as “court fees; fees for lawyers, experts, and other professionals; the risk of costshifting to the losing side[;] . . . risks of countersuits; and lost time, salary, and other opportunities”).
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been adopted.230 As one recent study of public participation in China
observed:
[A] major transformation is underway in China’s environmental
governance . . . This transformation is vividly demonstrated by
formalized public participation measures such as information
disclosure and public hearing, flourishing environmental NGOs, and
heated online discussions on environmental controversies. For some
high-profile cases, . . . public participation in a variety of forms has
successfully changed official policies and got the voices of nonstate
sectors heard.231

3. Affirmative Consultation Rights
A closely related trend is establishing requirements in domestic law
for state authorities to affirmatively consult with Indigenous or traditional
communities before adopting measures likely to affect them.232
Again, these frameworks have sometimes been adopted under
international agreements, whereas others have been adopted on the state’s
own initiative.233
A significant limitation of these consultation frameworks is that most
do not make the consent of affected communities a condition for adopting
the relevant decision.234 The opposition of Indigenous stakeholders may
230. José Juan González Márquez, Key Regional Perspectives on Public Participation: Mexico
and Central America, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF MINING AND ENERGY RESOURCES 629, 649
(Donald N. Zillman, Alastair R. Lucas & George (Rock) Pring eds., 2002) (discussing a mining project
in which federal and local authorities in Mexico responded to community input by implementing a
number of environmental and social safeguards); Ian E. Cecala & A. Bryan Endres, Damnesia: An
Examination of Public Participation and Evolving Approaches to Hydropower Development in the
United States and Brazil, 55 IDAHO L. REV. 115, 124 (2019) (“[O]pen and meaningful participation
mechanisms in the environmental decision making process help foster an informed citizenry, a
transparent and accountable government, and overall higher quality decision making related to the
environment.”); Adam Eckerd & Roy L. Heidelberg, Administering Public Participation, 50 AM. REV.
PUB. ADMIN. 133, 135 (2020) (noting that public participation in EIA processes “fosters legitimacy”
and “can improve social justice outcomes”).
231. Chen, supra note 227, at 3.
232. DWIGHT G. NEWMAN, REVISITING THE DUTY TO CONSULT ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 154–62
(2014) (surveying domestic legal frameworks around the world that require consultations with
Indigenous peoples in various contexts).
233. Dwight Newman, Michelle Biddulph & Lorelle Binnion, Arctic Energy Development and
Best Practices on Consultation with Indigenous Peoples, 32 B.U. INT’L L.J. 449, 471–80 (2014).
234. Chantal Carriere, Federal Approval of Oil Pipelines and Indigenous Consultations in the
United States After Standing Rock and Keystone XL: Lessons from Canada on the Limits of IndustryIndigenous Consultation, 42 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 321, 385 (2020) (“[T]he Supreme Court of Canada has
reiterated that under the duty to consult and accommodate, First Nations do not have a veto right over
government action, and there is no duty to agree.”); Claudia Iseli, Comment, The Operationalization
of the Principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent: A Duty to Obtain Consent or Simply a Duty to
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sometimes prevent state authorities from approving an activity,235 but not
always. It is still all too common for governments to grant outsiders access
to lands and resources without the consent of their traditional occupants or
users, resulting in commercial activities that can carry serious
environmental and social costs.236 Still, the fact that domestic legal
frameworks increasingly mandate consultations indicates that local input
is widely viewed as essential to the fairness and legitimacy of decisionmaking—particularly when the interests of Indigenous or traditional
communities are implicated.
4. Benefit-Sharing Rights
States around the world have also adopted a variety of mechanisms
for sharing state-controlled benefits with groups and individuals who have
a particular stake in the activity from which the benefits are derived.
In some cases, the national state transfers a share of revenues from
state-owned natural resources to local authorities where the development
activity is taking place or to a community-managed fund.237 In others, the
state mandates that resource developers make infrastructure improvements
or offer other benefits to local communities as a condition for the state’s
approval of the project.238 Another approach is to mandate that developers
enter into contracts with impacted communities that provide for benefit-

Consult?, 38 UCLA J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 259, 266–70 (2020) (surveying several domestic frameworks
for consultation with Indigenous peoples and concluding that most “only impose a duty to consult and
not a duty to achieve consent”).
235. NEWMAN, supra note 232, at 105 (“[E]xperience over the years with the [duty to consult in
Canada] does show that it can lead to major modifications to projects or even cancellations of projects
that would have unacceptably severe impacts on Aboriginal communities.”).
236. Foster, supra note 145, at 638–43 (describing multiple development projects that
governments around the world authorized without the consent of affected Indigenous communities);
see also Jochen von Bernstorff, Who Is Entitled to Cultivate the Land? Sovereignty, Land Resources,
and Foreign Investments in Agriculture in International Law, in NATURAL RESOURCES GRABBING:
AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 55, 55–56, 71 (Francesca Romanin Jacur, Angelica Bonfanti
& Francesco Seatzu eds., 2016) (discussing large-scale, state-approved agricultural investments and
how they can adversely affect the land’s traditional users).
237. See Marie Mazalto, Governance, Human Rights and Mining in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, in MINING IN AFRICA: REGULATION AND DEVELOPMENT 187, 214 (Bonnie Campbell, ed.,
2009) (a mining code in the Democratic Republic of the Congo requires that “40 per cent of mineral
royalties must be paid to the province and to the local authority where the projects are developed”);
WORLD BANK, MINING FOUNDATIONS, TRUSTS AND FUNDS: A SOURCE BOOK 73–76 (2010)
(describing the use of social funds established by the Peruvian state and funded by mining developer
contributions); GHAZALA MANSURI & VIJAYENDRA RAO, LOCALIZING DEVELOPMENT: DOES
PARTICIPATION WORK? 16 (2013) (discussing the increasing prevalence of community-managed
funds derived from state-owned natural resources).
238. HÅVARD HALLAND, MARTIN LOKANC, ARVIND NAIR & SRIDAR PADMANABHAN KANNAN,
THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES SECTOR: ESSENTIALS FOR ECONOMISTS, PUBLIC FINANCE
PROFESSIONALS, AND POLICY MAKERS 71 (2015).
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sharing.239 Under any of these scenarios, the community receives a share
of benefits that could otherwise have been claimed by the state or used for
other public purposes.
In addition, developing countries participating in the REDD+
program have adopted frameworks providing for a portion of revenues
flowing from donors to be used to benefit forest-dependent communities,
as required by the international standards described in Part II.A.3.b. 240
Benefits made available under REDD+ have included funding for capacity
building, direct payments, training in sustainable livelihoods, and funding
for local infrastructure.241
Finally, numerous countries have adopted domestic regulatory
frameworks to implement the Nagoya Protocol’s requirements for
consultation and benefit-sharing in connection with the use of traditional
knowledge and genetic resources.242 Success has been limited so far in
negotiating agreements that deliver benefits to holders of traditional
knowledge, in part because of lingering legal uncertainties and
bureaucratic hurdles in some countries.243 Nevertheless, there have been
some notable achievements, including a recent substantial agreement
between the San and Khoi peoples of Southern Africa and the rooibos
industry.244
239. Kendra E. Dupuy, Community Development Requirements in Mining Laws, 1 EXTRACTIVE
INDUS. & SOC’Y 200, 200–02 (2014) (describing legislation in a number of countries mandating
community-developer agreements).
240. INDON. REDD+ TASK FORCE, REDD+ NATIONAL STRATEGY 32 (2012) (outlining benefitsharing framework in Indonesia); UN-REDD PROGRAMME, NATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR REDD+
STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 8, 29 (2016) (describing potential community benefits and the benefitsharing framework adopted under Kenyan law). Other national action plans are available on the UNREDD Programme’s website at https://www.unredd.net/documents/un-redd-partner-countries181/national-redd-strategies-1025.html [https://perma.cc/4GSM-KAZV].
241. Kathleen Lawlor, Erin Myers Madeira, Jill Blockhus & David Ganz, Community
Participation and Benefits in REDD+: A Review of Initial Outcomes and Lessons, 4 FORESTS 296,
305 (2013) (identifying benefits delivered, including jobs, payments, or in-kind contributions to
educational systems and infrastructure); THE FORESTS DIALOGUE & INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION
OF NATURE, COUNTRY OPTIONS FOR REDD+ BENEFIT-SHARING (2014) (describing forms of benefitsharing pursued by various countries).
242. See THE ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING CLEARING-HOUSE, INTERIM NATIONAL REPORT
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NAGOYA PROTOCOL (country reports detailing domestic legal
frameworks adopted pursuant to the Nagoya Protocol).
243. See Michael Heinrich, Francesca Scotti, Adolfo Andrade-Cetto, Monica Berger-Gonzalez,
Javier Echeverría, Fabio Friso, Felipe Garcia-Cardona, Alan Hesketh, Martin Hitziger, Caroline
Maake, Matteo Politi, Carmenza Spadafora & Rita Spadafora, Access and Benefit Sharing Under the
Nagoya Protocol—Quo Vadis? Six Latin American Case Studies Assessing Opportunities and Risk,
FRONTIERS IN PHARMACOLOGY, June 8, 2020, at 1 (acknowledging that agreements have been signed
in some countries but highlighting factors that have impeded greater collaboration).
244. See generally Doris Schroeder, Roger Chennells, Collin Louw, Leana Snyders & Timothy
Hodges, The Rooibos Benefit Sharing Agreement-Breaking New Ground with Respect, Honesty,
Fairness, and Care, 29 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 285, 285 (2020) (discussing the rooibos
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5. Other Opportunities
States’ domestic systems reflect numerous other mechanisms for
members of the public to be involved in aspects of governance beyond
those highlighted above. The discussion below provides a sampling of
these mechanisms, selected to provide a sense of their diversity.
Some participatory opportunities have roots in longstanding
traditions that are specific to the country or region where they are
employed. An example is the majlis in Saudi Arabia and certain other Arab
countries: an open house held periodically by leaders to elicit input from
the community and allow citizens to air grievances.245 Another is the
village assembly presided over by traditional leaders in many parts of
Africa, in which community members can share information, present
complaints, and resolve disputes over access to common resources.246
Other participatory mechanisms are of more recent vintage but are
already entrenched in legal systems around the world. Among these is the
widespread practice of eliciting public input during land use planning. This
is often said to enhance the decision-making process’s legitimacy and
effectiveness, even if scholars sometimes argue that more could be done
to secure community involvement and utilize the input provided.247
Some participatory mechanisms are decidedly ad hoc, like certain
televised community consultative forums that Chinese authorities have
held in recent years in response to public outcries over controversial

agreement and describing it as “the biggest benefit sharing agreement between industry and
[traditional knowledge] holders since the adoption of the CBD more than a quarter of a century ago”).
245. See Caroline Montagu, Civil Society in Saudi Arabia: The Power and Challenges of
Association, CHATHAM HOUSE RSCH. PAPER 24 (2015) (“The majlis, or meeting, is the traditional
regular open house held by senior members of the community, princes, businessmen, tribal and
religious leaders, and some professionals . . . as channels for people to make their views known and
to raise suggestions, grievances or other topics.”).
246. B.N. Ngwenya & D.L. Kgathi, Traditional Public Assembly (Kgotla) and Natural Resource
Management in Ngamiland, Botswana, in RURAL LIVELIHOODS, RISK AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
ACCESS TO NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE OKAVANGO DELTA, BOTSWANA 249, 256–57 (D.L. Kgathi,
B.N. Ngwenya & M.B.K. Darkoh eds., 2011) (describing the role of the kgotla in Botswana and similar
village assemblies in other African countries).
247. Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for
Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions,
Installment Two, 24 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 269, 284 (2005) (“Consensus-based land use planning
theory . . . emphasizes bringing together the wide range of stakeholders affected by a particular
decision to determine the best acceptable plan by mutual consent.”); Michael Pacione, The Rhetoric
and Reality of Public Participation in Planning, 63 URB. DEV. ISSUES 5, 6 (2019) (noting the use of
public participation in land use planning processes in many countries, which is widely viewed “as a
key element of local democracy as well as a way to improve the legitimacy of decisions leading to
more socially acceptable and sustainable planning outcomes”).
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governmental decisions.248 Peking University professors Wang Xixin and
Zhang Yongle attribute this phenomenon and other participation initiatives
in China to officials’ growing awareness that the ruling party must become
more responsive to local concerns in order to maintain its legitimacy.249
Law enforcement is another aspect of governance in which public
participation is sometimes sought and for similar reasons. One example is
community policing: an approach to law enforcement that seeks to build a
collaborative relationship with the community by developing partnerships
with key stakeholders, identifying the most urgent concerns of community
members, and working with these community members to develop
remedies for those concerns.250 Law enforcement agencies around the
world have experimented with community policing to boost their
reputations and improve their performance.251 Notably, police departments
across the United States purported to adopt a community policing model
after the Rodney King incident in the 1990s, 252 although some have been
accused of subsequently deprioritizing community collaboration until
coming under renewed scrutiny after the murder of George Floyd.253 This
latter injustice has generated new pressure on agencies to become more
community-oriented while also raising the prospect that some agencies
could be defunded or replaced with something altogether different, which

248. See Wang Xixin & Zhang Yongle, The Rise of Participatory Governance in China:
Empirical Models, Theoretical Framework, and Institutional Analysis, 13 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 24,
35–38, 46–48 (2018).
249. Id. at 30–31.
250. DREW DIAMOND & DEIRDRE MEAD WEISS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ADVANCING
COMMUNITY POLICING THROUGH COMMUNITY GOVERNANCE 5–6 (2009) (defining community
policing).
251. See Lorraine Mazerolle, Sarah Bennet, Jac T. Mengersen Davis, Elise Sargeant & Matthew
Manning, Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy: A Systematic Review of the Research Evidence,
9 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 245, 246 (2013) (“Police departments throughout the world are
increasingly interested in implementing operational programs that seek to increase police
legitimacy.”); id. at 256 (asserting that the most common approach is to develop “a closer partnership
between the police and the community . . . through community-oriented police training, the creation
of special community-oriented task forces or foot patrol officers, or the provision of grants for
community policing activities.”).
252. See Jim Newton, Community-Based Policing Slowly Takes Root at LAPD, L.A. TIMES
(June 21, 1996), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1996-06-21-mn-17128-story.html
[https://perma.cc/D8S3-YUZC] (discussing early efforts in Los Angeles to adopt “a philosophy of law
enforcement that de-emphasizes arrests in favor of problem solving and community involvement”);
Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Different Lyrics, Same Song: Watts, Ferguson, and the Stagnating Effect of the
Politics of Law and Order, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 305, 343–44 (2017) (discussing the connection
between the public furor over the Rodney King beating and the community policing movement of the
1990s).
253. See Kim Hart & Michele Salcedo, The Return of Community Policing, AXIOS (June 18,
2020), https://www.axios.com/community-policing-return-george-floyd-e057cb65-b406-498d-a00ce708b404719f.html [https://perma.cc/ZXV4-HWBK].
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the affected communities would control.254 That such measures have been
seriously discussed is stark evidence that state actors risk a legitimacy
crisis—and perhaps even a loss of power and resources—if they fail to
build trust and collaboration with those most affected by their activities.
C. The Participation Principle as an Emerging International Norm or
Meta-Norm
In light of such extensive international and domestic state practice
that reflects the Participation Principle in some fashion, it is difficult to
escape the conclusion that the principle is an emerging international norm.
Alternatively, one might describe it as a “meta-norm,” in the sense that it
unifies—and has inspired—a set of more specific norms.
The principle’s precise contours are debatable, but its central core
seems beyond dispute: that states must create some means for members of
the public to participate in governance, either directly or indirectly.255 The
preceding discussion suggests that further nuances regarding the types of
participation required are becoming more accepted over time.
One of these nuances is the notion that states must provide access to
information and opportunities to provide meaningful input into aspects of
governance likely to have significance impacts on the environment. In
fact, public participation requirements have become so prevalent in
environmental law at both the domestic and international levels that some
scholars have argued that participation in environmental matters is now
required by a customary norm or general principle of law, or that such an
obligation is well on the way to materializing.256

254. See Zack Budryk, Biden Highlights Community Policing Amid Calls to Defund
Departments, THE HILL (June 10, 2020), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/502064-bidenhighlights-community-policing-amid-calls-to-defund-departments
[https://perma.cc/BZ9H-6XZ2]
(discussing widespread calls to defund police departments in the wake of the George Floyd killing,
and then-candidate Joe Biden’s alternative proposal to spend $300 million on community policing
initiatives); Gabriella Borter, Minneapolis City Council Resolves to Replace Police with CommunityLed Model, REUTERS (June 12, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-minneapolis-policeprotests-reform/minneapolis-city-council-resolves-to-replace-police-with-community-led-modelidUSKBN23J2W5 [https://perma.cc/35T3-23XD] (reporting that the Minneapolis City Council
unanimously passed a resolution “to pursue a community-led public safety system to replace the police
department following the death of George Floyd at the hands of the city’s police”).
255. See supra Section II.A.1 for the argument that this central core represents customary
international law. See also Damrosch, supra note 10, at 40 (citing evidence of the existence of such a
norm and observing that “Western-style pluralist democracy is only one of a variety of models that
states may employ to give their citizens a voice in government”).
256. See, e.g., Bruch, supra note 10, at 11389; Leslie-Anne Duvic-Paoli, The Status of the Right
to Public Participation in International Environmental Law: An Analysis of the Jurisprudence, 23
Y.B. INT’L ENVT’L L. 80, 85 (2012) (“[D]espite the fact that the ICJ has not yet recognized the
existence of an obligation to include the public in environmental decisions, the right to public
participation could be acknowledged later as a general principle of law or as a customary norm.”).
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Another nuance is the proposition that government entities should
provide enhanced participation opportunities to individuals and groups
that are particularly vulnerable or at risk of marginalization. This notion is
particularly well developed with regard to Indigenous and traditional
communities, which are already the subject of a number of international
obligations specific to such communities, certain of which are sometimes
asserted to be coalescing into customary norms or general principles.257
However, as previously demonstrated, it is increasingly common for states
to make special efforts to promote the participation of other groups and
individuals as well, including women, youth, and minority groups.
There is also growing support for the idea that states should share
benefits within their control in a fair and equitable way. At the most
fundamental level there is the admonition in the UDHR and other human
rights instruments that all citizens should have equal access to state
services or property.258 Beyond that, the preceding discussion has
identified extensive international and domestic authority providing for the
sharing of benefits from activities that directly and significantly affect
local stakeholders, particularly natural resource extraction and the
utilization of traditional knowledge or genetic resources. Some scholars
interpret this authority as evidence of yet another nascent customary norm
or general principle.259 While these scholars refer to this putative
obligation as one of benefit-sharing rather than of benefit-participation,
some international authorities notably do use the term participation.260 The
latter terminology highlights the connection between benefit-sharing and
other obligations encompassed by the Participation Principle: each

257. See supra Section II.A.2–3 and infra Section III.B.
258. See supra Section II.A.1.
259. Riccardo Pavoni, Biodiversity and Biotechnology: Consolidation and Strains in the
Emerging International Legal Regimes, in BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 29, 40–41
(Franco Francioni & Tullio Scovazzi eds., 2006) (highlighting the proliferation of authority calling for
benefit-sharing in the context of traditional knowledge and genetic resources and asserting that “the
duty of benefit-sharing is steadily emerging as a rule of customary law”); Morgera, supra note 10, at
382–83 (identifying a wide range of requirements for benefit-sharing and raising the possibility that
the concept “is evolving into a principle that may affect the exercise of states’ discretionary powers in
relation to the development, interpretation, and application of international law in the absence of an
applicable treaty basis”).
260. See Morgera, supra note 10, at 363 (acknowledging the equivalence of the terms
“participation” and “sharing” used in different sources); UNDRD, supra note 92, art. 2(3) (calling for
states to ensure all individuals’ “active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the
fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom”) (emphasis added); Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples’ Convention, supra note 13, art. 15 (providing that Indigenous and Tribal peoples “shall
wherever possible participate in the benefits of” natural resource use) (emphasis added); USMCA,
supra note 194, art. 25.2(b) (“[E]ach Party shall seek to increase trade and investment opportunities,
and in particular shall . . . promote SMEs owned by under-represented groups . . . and their
participation in trade”) (emphasis added).
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provides the right holder with the ability to participate in matters over
which the state has control as a function of state sovereignty.
Finally, it is increasingly inevitable that members of the public will
be allowed input into the creation or implementation of international
authority, at least when the authority implicates governance functions: a
practice that is likewise sometimes argued to reflect a customary norm.261
While these various notions may not all be articulated in the same
treaties, laws, or other authority, they are closely related and can be viewed
as motivated by an overarching concept. Namely, together they stand for
the proposition that states should invite the participation of the governed
in the prerogatives of sovereignty, and that the form of participation
provided should vary depending on the extent of the relevant stakeholder’s
interest, need, or vulnerability.
Certain of the nuances highlighted above may not yet have
crystallized into binding international obligations (beyond treaty
commitments), but the clear trend is toward their increasing acceptance by
the international community. It stands to reason that recognizing these
disparate concepts as related and springing from the same root may speed
the acceptance of those aspects that have not yet achieved universality,
while also facilitating further scholarly inquiry into the possible existence
of a norm or meta-norm of participation. Moreover, if a unifying theme
does indeed underlie the multiple obligations identified above, then there
is every reason to expect that it will inspire further norm development
going forward.
D. Participation Rights as Aspects of Sovereignty
The discussion so far in Part II has suggested that the creation of
participation rights is not only widely attested in state practice but reflects
a growing sense of legal obligation. States are creating these rights because
they believe they are required to do so by international obligations or
because they perceive these rights as otherwise necessary to secure and
legitimate their governmental authority.
This phenomenon must be viewed in light of popular sovereignty. As
previously noted, it is widely accepted today that sovereignty is derived
from the people, as expressed in Article 21(3) of the UDHR: “The will of
the people shall be the basis of the authority of government.”262
Participation rights can be understood as the means by which this concept
is operationalized: the mechanism that channels the will of the people and
transforms a claim to governmental authority into a governance “right.”
261. See supra Section II.A.3.e.
262. UDHR, supra note 36, art. 21(3).
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To put it another way, participation rights—as opposed to governance
rights—are that portion of sovereignty that is reserved in and wielded
directly by the people. Under this conceptual framework, when the people
create a state, they do not give it absolute power and fully divest
themselves of sovereignty; they reserve the ability to participate in
governance and share equitably in state-controlled benefits. The precise
form that the people’s participation rights take will vary from country to
country and even from place to place within a country. These rights may
also depend to some extent on state willingness to recognize and respect
them. Yet the people can indirectly shape the scope and content of those
rights via the influence they have over the state as a result of their
participation rights.
Participation rights are thus not merely a limitation on sovereignty,
but part and parcel of sovereignty, as necessary companions to governance
rights. It is this relationship to sovereignty that distinguishes both
categories of rights from other rights that may be held by groups or
individuals—whether arising under international law or domestic law.
Other rights may give the right holder protection against unwanted state
action or an affirmative entitlement to state protection, but only
governance and participation rights confer access to the state’s own
sovereign prerogatives.
Participation rights’ status as an element of sovereignty is further
evident from how closely related they are to governance rights: so much
so that they are at times almost indistinguishable. For instance, if a central
government grants a local government in a mineral-producing region a
dedicated share of state revenues from the mineral’s exploitation, the
community secures a participation right. However, once the community
controls those revenues and can spend them as it chooses, it holds a
governance right.
The two types of rights are best seen as elements of a dynamic
continuum rather than fully distinct. In this posited continuum, the
constituent parts not only interact with one another and are essential to
their respective operations, but their location in the continuum can shift as
the state’s political and legal system evolves—with participation rights
potentially transitioning into governance rights or vice versa. For example,
an Indigenous people might go from having a right to be consulted about
projects to exploit natural resources on its land to securing the right to
decide for itself whether or not to develop those resources.263

263. See CARLY A. DOKIS, WHERE THE RIVERS MEET: PIPELINES, PARTICIPATORY RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT, AND ABORIGINAL-STATE RELATIONS IN THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES 98 (2015)
(discussing the negotiation of Land Claims Agreements between Aboriginal groups and the federal
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Alternatively, a local or provincial government might be granted control
over certain extractive activities within its territory but then later have that
right withdrawn.264
One way of viewing these two categories of rights is as twin facets
of sovereignty, like two sides of the same coin. Sovereign authority may
take the more prominent position on the obverse of this coin, but the will
and involvement of the people must always be present to some extent as
the legitimating accompaniment on the reverse. States have learned the
hard way that the latter component is essential; without adequate
participation rights they are likely to lack popular support and risk uprising
or secession.265 Hence, governance rights without participation rights are
like a coin stamped on only one side: illegal tender to be used at one’s peril
in the marketplace of public sentiment.
III. THE DIALECTIC OF HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL SOVEREIGNTYSHARING
Part II demonstrated that participation and governance rights are
proliferating on two separate levels as states share their sovereignty in new
ways both horizontally and vertically. The discussion that follows will
seek to demonstrate that these two forms of sovereignty-sharing interact
with and stimulate one another in a dialectical relationship.
This dynamic helps explain the rapid rate of change in the domestic
and international systems in recent decades. Moreover, understanding the
interplay between international and domestic developments and viewing
them through a lens of sovereignty-sharing allows one to reconcile these
changes with the concept of state sovereignty and provides insights into
how sovereignty is evolving.

government in Canada, which give the relevant groups ownership over subsurface minerals and
require their permission to explore for or exploit those minerals).
264. See, e.g., Boris Verbrugge, Decentralization, Institutional Ambiguity, and Mineral
Resource Conflict in Mindanao, Philippines, 67 WORLD DEV. 449, 453–54 (2015) (describing an
executive order in the Philippines denying local governments the power to block mining projects,
despite a prior grant of authority in national legislation giving them that power).
265. Ludsin, supra note 9, at 115 (“Any government that controls the state against the wishes of
the people does not receive sovereign authority. It may have the power to enforce its will against the
people, but the illegitimate government is not entitled to sovereign rights.”); Pranab Bardhan & Dilip
Mookherjee, The Rise of Local Governments: An Overview, in DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL
GOVERNANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1, 4 (Pranab Bardhan &
Dilip Mookherjee eds., 2006) (“[P]opular participation . . . can promote a sense of autonomy in
citizens, enhance social order by promoting the legitimacy of the state, and limit pressures for
separatism by diverse regions or ethnic groups.”).
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A. International Agreements and Organizations that Require or
Encourage Domestic Power-Sharing and Participation
Part II highlighted several examples of horizontal sovereigntysharing: the phenomenon whereby states sign treaties or otherwise
establish rules to govern conduct within their respective borders or create
supranational bodies and charge them with doing so. In fact, all of the
binding authority referenced in Part II—from the ICCPR to the USMCA
to the Participation Principle itself—qualify as horizontal sovereigntysharing under this definition.
The linkage to vertical sovereignty-sharing results from the fact that
international agreements, norms, or bodies often require or encourage
states to grant new governance or participation rights to subnational actors.
Whether the relevant authority calls for the Indigenous peoples of
Nicaragua to be afforded forms of self-government, the peoples of Nigeria
to have consultation and resource revenue-sharing rights, or the general
public in Norway to have input into EIA processes, the national state is
being asked to share aspects of sovereignty with actors below it in the
domestic hierarchy.
In some cases, the relevant agreement expressly calls for the
extension of new governance or participation rights to subnational actors,
and so states are presumably well aware that vertical sovereignty-sharing
will ensue.266 In other cases, the agreement makes no such express
reference but eventually is interpreted as contemplating domestic powersharing or participation: an outcome that states may not have anticipated.
Consider, for example, Common Article 1 of the International
Covenants, which asserts that “peoples” have a right to selfdetermination.267 When these Covenants were first adopted, the right to
self-determination was generally understood as being held by the entire
national populations of states, or by colonial peoples oppressed by foreign
domination.268 It was only later that there came to be widespread
266. For example, the Aarhus Convention expressly calls for members of the public in member
states to have rights to participate in environmental decision-making. See supra Section II.A.3.b.
267. ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 1; ICESCR, supra note 37, art. 1.
268. See Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 23–24 (1993) (“[A]
careful examination of the legislative history of the covenants leads to the conclusion that a restrictive
interpretation of the right of self-determination comports with the views of the majority of the states
that supported the right.”); Helen Quane, The United Nations and the Evolving Right to SelfDetermination, 47 INT’L & COMPAR. L. Q. 537, 561 (1998) (reviewing the drafting history and
concluding: “All that one can state with certainty is that Article 1 applies to peoples organised as States
and colonial peoples”); Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Question of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: A Time
for Reappraisal?, in STATEHOOD AND SELF-DETERMINATION: RECONCILING TRADITION AND
MODERNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 349, 357 (Duncan French ed., 2013) (explaining that in the
1960s “the predominant view was that the term ‘peoples’ in Article 1 was understood as all inhabitants
of a State or a colony”).
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acceptance that Article 1 contemplates a right of “internal” selfdetermination for subnational peoples, entitling them to self-government
or at least meaningful participation in the national government.269 As this
broader interpretation has taken hold, many subnational peoples have
seized on it to advocate for autonomy measures270 or new international
instruments that expressly recognize their right to self-determination.271
These efforts have been successful in many cases, as demonstrated by the
profusion of autonomy arrangements worldwide272 and UNDRIP’s
language on Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.
This shows that when states engage in horizontal sovereignty-sharing
(by entering into an international convention with other states), these states
may set a series of events in motion that will lead to new forms of verticalsovereignty-sharing, even if that was not the states’ intention. This
outcome may become all the more likely if states create international
bodies and task them with interpreting international agreements or
monitoring their implementation. For example, UN bodies charged with
tracking compliance with the International Covenants and other human
rights instruments have sometimes encouraged states to grant autonomy to
minority groups or raised questions about the extent to which purported
autonomy measures have been implemented.273
269. See the discussion supra Section II.A.1; see also Gilbert, supra note 86, at 327–32
(summarizing the evolving interpretation of self-determination to include an internal aspect applicable
to subnational peoples).
270. Simpson, supra note 44, at 258–59 (noting that self-determination has been invoked “by,
and on behalf of, non-state populations as diverse as the Kurds, the Quebecois, the Basques, the Scots,
the Palestinians, the East Timorese, and the Tamils”); JONAS BENS, THE INDIGENOUS PARADOX:
RIGHTS, SOVEREIGNTY, AND CULTURE IN THE AMERICAS 13–14 (2020) (discussing how Indigenous
rights advocates have harnessed UNDRIP and other international authority to promote domestic
reforms).
271. Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous
Peoples’ Claims in International and Comparative Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 189, 238, 217
(2001) (during the drafting of UNDRIP, representatives of Indigenous peoples “proposed
incorporation of a version of Article 1(1) of the 1966 Covenants . . . , modified to state expressly that
the right of self-determination belonged to indigenous peoples”).
272. Edward L. Rubin, Federalism as a Problem of Governance, Not of Doctrinal Warfare, 59
ST. LOUIS L.J. 1117, 1124–26 (2015) (describing a multitude of autonomy regimes, from the creation
of autonomous regions in places like Scotland, Catalonia and Sicily to frameworks for particular
Indigenous groups in Russia, Australia, and the United States).
273. See, e.g., U.N. OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RTS., MINORITY RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS AND GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION 41 (2010) (identifying risks of violence,
discrimination, and other threats to minority groups and individuals, and observing that “rights,
identity and culture can be strengthened through the introduction and promotion of certain forms of
self-governance, including territorial or cultural autonomy”); Kelley Loper, Substantive Equality in
International Human Rights Law and its Relevance for the Resolution of Tibetan Autonomy Claims,
37 N.C. J. INT’L L. 1, 44 (2011) (“When interacting with the Chinese government through the state
reporting process, human rights treaty bodies . . . have raised issues related to the implementation of
autonomy as well as minority language and education policies.”).
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The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ interpretation of the
American Convention as implicitly requiring a variety of participation
rights is another example.274 The signatories to that Convention may not
have realized that in agreeing to recognize various general human rights—
such as a right of everyone to use and enjoy property—they would
ultimately be found to have committed to certain specific safeguards for
Indigenous and traditional communities. Yet once the Court reached that
interpretation, states were bound to implement these participation rights
vertically into their domestic laws.275
Similarly, the World Bank and IMF (two organizations created by
states via international agreement) have often encouraged or required
states to devolve regulatory powers to lower-level political subdivisions276
or engage in benefit-sharing with local communities.277 The creation of
these bodies is thus yet another example of a decision by states to share
authority on the international plane leading indirectly to new sovereignty
allocations on the domestic plane.
None of these examples are intended to caution against the creation
of international organizations or the signing of human rights agreements.
To the contrary, certain power-sharing and participatory arrangements that
these actions helped bring about represent vital protections for groups and
individuals at risk of discrimination, violence, and other serious threats.278
Moreover, as argued in greater detail below in Part III.C, granting new
authority and influence to subnational actors has benefited states
themselves in several ways. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that horizontal
274. See supra Section II.A.3.a.
275. Ward, supra note 10, at 84 (“Within . . . the Inter-American System, respecting the right to
consultation requires that States adopt legislation in order to implement indigenous peoples’
participation rights.”).
276. MANSURI & RAO, supra note 238, at 1 (discussing World Bank initiatives to promote and
fund decentralization measures); Bardhan & Mookherjee, supra note 265, at 17 (asserting that Brazil
adopted sweeping decentralization measures under pressure from the World Bank and IMF).
277. See MANSURI & RAO, supra note 238, at 1 (explaining that the World Bank has sought to
“bring villages, urban neighborhoods, or other household groupings into the process of managing
development resources without relying on formally constituted local governments”); Dupuy, supra
note 239, at 209 (asserting that Sierra Leone’s decision to adopt new revenue-sharing requirements
resulted from pressure from the World Bank and other international organizations).
278. See Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-Determination, 87 J. PHIL. 439, 450
(1990) (“Sometimes the prosperity of the group and its self-respect are aided by, sometimes they may
be impossible to secure without, the group’s enjoying political sovereignty over its own affairs.”);
Tina Kempin Reuter, Dealing with Claims of Ethnic Minorities in International Law, 24 CONN. J.
INT’L L. 201, 228 (2009) (discussing evidence that autonomy can help avert “violent ethnic conflict
and gross human rights violations”); Siegfried Wiessner, Re-Enchanting the World: Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights as Essential Parts of a Holistic Human Rights Regime, 15 UCLA J. INT’L L. &
FOREIGN AFFS. 239, 286 (2010) (noting that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights “radically reinterpreted the right to property,” but that the court’s safeguards are essential to address threats to
Indigenous peoples’ spirituality, traditions, languages, territories, and physical security).
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sovereignty-sharing has helped nudge states beyond what would otherwise
be more conservative tendencies, incrementally producing new vertical
arrangements that states might have been reluctant to embrace all at once.
B. Domestic Power-Sharing or Participation that Stimulates or
Transmutes into International Authority
As profound of an influence as horizontal sovereignty-sharing can
have on states’ domestic orders, it represents only one-half of a broader
dialectic. Similar stimulation can happen in reverse: when states confer
new rights vertically on subnational actors, it can result in even more
horizontal sovereignty-sharing.
One way this can occur is if states allow individuals or groups to
participate in their sovereign processes in particular ways, and states’
positive experience with these arrangements prompts them to adopt
parallel frameworks internationally, which call for yet further
participation. This happened, for example, when states created domestic
EIA regimes featuring public participation, and later the same states
adopted international agreements that contained similar participation
requirements.
The first such domestic EIA regime was established by the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) in the United States.279 This
legislation and its implementing regulations made public participation a
core part of the EIA process, which soon federal agencies and other entities
considered indispensable to the quality and legitimacy of environmental
decision-making.280 NEPA inspired similar EIA regimes around the
world,281 including in the European Union, which by 1985 required all
member states to have participatory EIA regimes.282 Thereafter, countries
with NEPA-inspired domestic legislation negotiated multilateral
international agreements that likewise required participatory EIAs and
even elaborated upon domestic precedent.283
279. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Karkkainen, supra note 226, at 948
(describing NEPA as “the world’s first statute to insist on comprehensive [EIA]”).
280. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND
DECISION MAKING 50 (Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stern eds., 2008) (explaining that federal agencies
see public participation “as a means of making their decisions more broadly acceptable to the public”).
281. See Karkkainen, supra note 226, at 948 (discussing the influence of NEPA internationally).
282. See Council Directive 85/337/EEC, art. 6, 1985 O.J. (L 175) (specifying obligations to
provide information to the public and opportunities to comment).
283. See John H. Knox, The Myth and Reality of Transboundary Environmental Impact
Assessment, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 291, 300 (2002) (discussing the Espoo Convention and other
international agreements that reflect public participation requirements in preexisting domestic
legislation, while going beyond domestic precedent by requiring participation rights for certain foreign
nationals).
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Vertical sovereignty-sharing can also transmute into horizontal
sovereignty-sharing if the granting of particular rights to subnational
actors becomes sufficiently pervasive that the practice achieves the status
of a general principle of law or of a customary international norm. The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights has asserted, for example, that the
practice of consulting with Indigenous communities has become so
common that it has achieved the status of a general principle of law.284
Others contend that the practice has become or is developing into a
customary norm.285 If either is true, then other states may be obliged to
comply with the practice even if they have not signed a treaty requiring it.
Similar arguments are sometimes made about the increasingly
widespread practice of granting forms of self-government to Indigenous
groups and other distinct subnational peoples.286 Further, it is not beyond
the realm of possibility that one day a minimum degree of power-sharing
could be recognized as obligatory even beyond the context of subnational
peoples, in light of how extensive the trend is for states to devolve
authority to lower-level political subdivisions nationwide.
That prospect—together with existing authority attesting to a right of
internal self-determination on the part of subnational peoples—shows just
how far we have come from Westphalian sovereignty. Not only does
sovereignty no longer require authority to be concentrated in the national
state; in today’s world monolithic state authority is arguably not even
allowed.
C. The Value of Tracing the Dialectic and Viewing It through a
Sovereignty-Sharing Lens
That international developments can spur changes at the domestic
level and vice versa is not remarkable in and of itself. Yet there is much to
be gained from identifying the specific ways in which these interactions
occur in the context of governance and participation rights and viewing
these phenomena through a sovereignty-sharing lens.
One advantage of this approach is that it helps explain how new
governance and participation rights have spread so rapidly in recent years.
As previously noted, when states decide to share authority on one level, it
284. Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 242, ¶ 164 (June 27, 2012) (holding that “the obligation to consult, in addition to being a treatybased provision, is also a general principle of international law”).
285. Ward, supra note 10275, at 84 (arguing that an obligation to consult with Indigenous
peoples prior to exploring for or exploiting resources within their territories is developing into a
customary norm).
286. See, e.g., Wiessner, supra note 278, at 277 (“A global review of state practice, combined
with the requisite opinio juris, has led to the finding of an indigenous people’s right to a wide range
of autonomy under customary international law.”).
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triggers pressure to do so in new ways on the other level as well. This
pressure gives rise to a cause-effect sequence in which the outputs of the
system circle back and become inputs, resulting in new sovereignty
allocations at an accelerating rate.
Understanding these interactions also highlights that when states
cede aspects of their own authority it often has consequences that they
never could have anticipated. To put it metaphorically, when states sign
onto international authority, form international organizations, or grant new
rights or powers to subnational actors, they create golems that will operate
to some extent beyond their control.
Whether these golems produce beneficial or harmful results may
depend on the context and on one’s perspective. For example, many
commentators have characterized investment treaties signed by states as
unduly limiting those states’ ability to regulate business activity carried
out by foreign investors.287 Others have criticized measures imposed by
the IMF as creating excessive social costs and exacerbating—rather than
alleviating—economic turmoil.288 Some have also at times questioned the
wisdom of devolving powers to lower-level authorities, which may be
corrupt or lack the capacity to manage functions effectively.289
Nevertheless, when an international agreement or body encourages
change in a domestic system it will often be to promote good governance
and respect for human rights—as when states share benefits with local
communities or give them a voice in public affairs. Furthermore, as much
as states may sometimes regret particular results of the dialectic, they
engage in sovereignty-sharing in the first instance because they believe it
will be in their own interest. The simple fact is that states can no longer
hoard authority as they once attempted to do. They need to share
sovereignty in some contexts to maintain their legitimacy, reduce
separatist pressures, and otherwise respond to economic, social, and
political challenges.290 States may sometimes cede too much authority or
287. See, e.g., George K. Foster, Investor-Community Conflicts in Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: Rethinking “Reasonable Expectations” and Expecting More from Investors, 69 AM. U. L.
REV. 105, 108–11 (2019) (critiquing a line of cases in investor-state arbitration in which tribunals
found states liable for canceling projects in response to public outcries over environmental and social
impacts); Barnali Choudhury, International Investment Law and Noneconomic Issues, 53 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 4 (2020) (“[T]he provisions of investment treaties may thwart state efforts to
regulate the effects of foreign investment in relation to social goals, such as those relating to human
rights protection and the environment.”).
288. See, e.g., Wolff, supra note 53, at 109–10.
289. See, e.g., Charles Palmer & Stefanie Engel, For Better or for Worse? Local Impacts of the
Decentralization of Indonesia’s Forest Sector, 35 WORLD DEV. 2131, 2136–38 (2007) (asserting that
decentralization in Indonesia resulted in an increase in logging, local rent-seeking, corruption, and
elite capture).
290. Bardhan & Mookerjee, supra note 265, at 18–32 (surveying decentralization measures in
multiple countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, and concluding that the dominant motive in a
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fail to incorporate adequate safeguards for the public interest when
empowering other actors, but retaining unilateral control is generally not
an option in this age of globalization and increasing local assertiveness.
Finally, viewing recent changes in the international and domestic
orders in terms of sovereignty-sharing helps reconcile these developments
with sovereignty, while providing insights into how sovereignty is
changing. This perspective notably calls into question the orthodox
position that, by virtue of sovereignty, states have complete discretion to
design their own political systems and determine how power is allocated
within them.291 This Article has presented abundant examples of states
adjusting their domestic systems in response to international pressures. It
has suggested, moreover, that some such adjustments may now be required
by customary international law—at least at a general level, with the
specifics left to the state. If that proposition is accepted, then these
international norms do not violate sovereignty but follow as the natural
consequence of states’ decisions to share sovereignty in particular ways.
Sovereignty must therefore have evolved to allow these external
influences, by becoming more malleable, nuanced, and multilayered.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to build on the existing literature regarding
sovereignty by developing two principal claims.
First, sovereignty is more than control over governance and
resources; it also consists of opportunities for groups and individuals to
participate in sovereign prerogatives short of control. Such participation
rights have spread widely in recent decades on both the international and
domestic levels, as states have come to view public participation as
essential to their legitimacy. The creation of these rights has occurred so
extensively, in fact, that certain forms of participation are arguably now
required by an emerging international norm or meta-norm—the
Participation Principle.

majority of cases was to buttress the legitimacy of the national government or quell separatist
tendencies); Catherine Schenk, The IMF Remains the Lender of Last Resort–Literally, CHATHAM
HOUSE (June 22, 2018), https://www.chathamhouse.org/2018/06/imf-remains-lender-last-resortliterally [https://perma.cc/HF36-CKJL] (“The stigma attached to seeking help from the International
Monetary Fund means countries try to avoid it wherever possible. But there are still no better options
for struggling emerging markets.”).
291. See, e.g., KRASNER, supra note 64, at 24 (asserting that rulers are “free to choose the
institutions and policies they regard as optimal,” and that “sovereignty is violated when external actors
influence or determine domestic authority structures”); Gregory H. Fox, Democracy, Right to,
International Protection, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW § 7 (Mar.
2008) (asserting that sovereignty gives states autonomy in designing governmental institutions and a
fundamental right to choose and implement their own political, economic and social systems).
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Second, the horizontal and vertical forms of sovereignty-sharing
interact with and stimulate one another in a dialectical process. That is,
when states share sovereignty on one level it often results in further
sovereignty-sharing on the other: a feedback loop that helps account for
the rapid rate of change that has occurred in the international and domestic
orders.
Going forward, there is every reason to expect that states will
continue to cede authority and influence to other actors, and that
sovereignty will become ever more pluralistic as a result. Still, this trend
does not necessarily mean that large states with powerful central
governments will eventually become a thing of the past, as some have
suggested. There may always be a role to be played by a coordinating
national authority, and distinct subnational peoples and minority groups
may continue to find it advantageous in some instances to remain part of
a larger national community. These outcomes will become more likely
rather than less so if national states continue to give subnational actors
control over aspects of governance in which they have a direct and
pronounced stake, and meaningful opportunities to participate in the rest.

